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Market power and voluntary land redistribution

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  • Lucie Ménager

    (LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas, EQUIPPE - Economie Quantitative, Intégration, Politiques Publiques et Econométrie - Université de Lille, Sciences et Technologies - Université de Lille, Sciences Humaines et Sociales - PRES Université Lille Nord de France - Université de Lille, Droit et Santé)

  • Christine Valente

    (School of Economics, Finance and Management - LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas)

Abstract

Inequality in land ownership remains a major issue in many developing countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa. Donors advocate a new model of "willing-buyer/willing-seller\", market-led land redistribution, but actual redistribution has fallen short of expectations. Little effort has been made so far to formalize the obstacles to market-led land redistribution. In this paper, we show that oligopolistic owner-producers may resist land sales to poorer candidate-buyers not only because they have a lower willingness to pay for land but also because the entry of poorer entrants threatens tacit collusion.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucie Ménager & Christine Valente, 2011. "Market power and voluntary land redistribution," Working Papers hal-00867615, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00867615
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00867615
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Land reform; Oligopoly;

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