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HedN Game, a Relational Framework for Network Based Cooperation

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  • Franck Delaplace

    (IBISC - Informatique, Biologie Intégrative et Systèmes Complexes - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Pierre Lescanne

    (LIP - Laboratoire de l'Informatique du Parallélisme - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper proposes a new framework for cooperative games based on mathematical relations. Here cooperation is defined as a supportive partnerships represented by a directed network between players (aka hedonic relation). We examine in a specific context, modeled by abstract games how a change of supports induces a modification of strategic interactions between players. Two levels of description are considered: the first one describes the support network formation whereas the second one models the strategic interactions between players. Both are described in a unified formalism, namely CP~game. Stability conditions are stated, emphasizing the connection between these two levels. We also stress the interaction between updates of supports and their impact on the evolution of the context.

Suggested Citation

  • Franck Delaplace & Pierre Lescanne, 2009. "HedN Game, a Relational Framework for Network Based Cooperation," Working Papers hal-00382514, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00382514
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00382514v2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bloch, Francis & Jackson, Matthew O., 2007. "The formation of networks with transfers among players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 83-110, March.
    2. Ballester, Coralio, 2004. "NP-completeness in hedonic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 1-30, October.
    3. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    4. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stability; Network; Cooperative Game; Hedonic Relation;
    All these keywords.

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