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Propriété intellecutelle et développement ou comment imposer au mon un système perverti

Author

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  • Claude Henry

    (CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Intellectual property rights, patents in particular, are meant to boost innovation. They also constitute a barrier against the diffusion of recently accumulated knowledge, which is a public good. For a long time a balance has been kept between these two forces ; since about 1980, that balance has been more and more tilted against the free use of knowledge.Even the incentive function has been blurred : it is not exceptional that a party different from the actual inventor or discoverer is granted the intellectual property rights, often with an astonishingly large breadth. These trends are specially prevalent in two fields of utmost importance for future growth and well-being : information and life sciences and technologies.This is the system that has been imposed, within the World Trade Organization (WTO), upon the developing countries. Hence not only are these funnelled into a uniform system, whereas in the past the presently developed countries have been able to have their intellectual property systems evolving in tune with their respective pace of development ; but that very system is also crippled with perversions. It is not a risky bet to anticipate public health havoc in developing countries and significant financial transfers from them towards the richest countries, as first consequences of TRIPS, as the WTO framework is known.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Henry, 2004. "Propriété intellecutelle et développement ou comment imposer au mon un système perverti," Working Papers hal-00242943, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00242943
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242943
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    References listed on IDEAS

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