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Des parasites au paradis ? Revenu universel, minima sociaux et réciprocité

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  • Guillaume Allegre

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

Should society feed surfers? The question has arisen in these terms since Van Parijs suggested to Rawls that a basic income would be in line with his theory of justice. Rawls replied that those who surf should find a way to support themselves. Most Western countries have guaranteed minimum incomes which have conditions in terms of social or professional integration efforts, in a logic of reciprocity. The refusal that others live voluntarily at their expense, in a parasitic relationship, is a value widely shared value across countries, religions and belief systems. For Van Parijs, basic income can be justified by the common ownership of exogenous resources (land, raw materials). From a non-perfectionist perspective, respecting everyone's conceptions of what a good life is, the fact that people using one's resources pay income to those who do not use them, maximizes the real freedom of all. It is argued here that this argument uses a specific conception of co-ownership (right equal to the income of the property), but that there is another conception (equal right to the use of the property). This later conception can be seen when co-owners of a tennis court can usually use it at leisure, but not rent the slots to an outside person. The idea of co-ownership of exogenous resources is therefore not a definitive argument for basic income. We conclude by discussing the characteristics of a guaranteed minimum income that would minimize various forms of injustice.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Allegre, 2021. "Des parasites au paradis ? Revenu universel, minima sociaux et réciprocité," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03474895, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03474895
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03474895
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    Keywords

    basic income; minimum income schemes; reciprocity; revenu universel; minimum social; réciprocité;
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