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L'importance des exclus de l'intégration monétaire en Europe

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  • Philippe Martin

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Contrairement à l'analyse traditionnelle, nous analysons les coûts associés non pas à l'inclusion mais à l'exclusion d'un pays de l'Union économique et monétaire européenne (UEM). Dans un modèle à trois pays, nous montrons que la politique monétaire du pays exclu sera plus expansionniste et plus contre-cyclique que celle des pays de l'UEM, ce qui la rapproche d'une stratégie de dépréciation compétitive. Le pays dont les chocs sont les plus symétriques à ceux du pays exclu sera le plus touché par cette exclusion voyant la variance de sa production augmenter. Nous examinons aussi les diverses propositions de gestion des relations entre l'UEM et les pays non UEM de VUE.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Martin, 1996. "L'importance des exclus de l'intégration monétaire en Europe," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01010094, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-01010094
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1996.409819
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-01010094
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin, Philippe, 1994. "Monetary policy and country size," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 573-586, October.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
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    8. Martin, Philippe, 1996. "A sequential approach to regional integration: The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 581-598, December.
    9. Artus, P., 1995. "L'Union monetaire sera-t-elle attrayante pour les pays peripheriques europeens?," Papers 1995-12/t, Caisse des Depots et Consignations - Cahiers de recherche.
    10. Dominique Pianelli, 1994. "L'après CAEM : la dynamique des échanges entre les pays de Visegrad," Working Papers 1994-16, CEPII research center.
    11. Martin, Philippe, 1995. "Free-riding, convergence and two-speed monetary unification in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1345-1364, August.
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    13. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    14. Eichengreen, Barry, 1993. "European Monetary Unification," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1321-1357, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ottilia Rouguet & Pierre Villa, 2000. "Le passage des retraites de la répartition à la capitalisation obligatoire : des simulations à l'aide s'une maquette calibrée," Working Papers 2000-02, CEPII research center.
    2. Kiichiro Fukasaku & David Martineau, 1999. "Coopération monétaire en Asie de l'Est : l'apport des tests de causalité et de la cointégration," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 140(4), pages 105-116.
    3. Thierry Warin, 2006. "A Note on Post-Modern Monetary Policy," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0617, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    4. Thierry Warin, 2005. "Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0508, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.

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    JEL classification:

    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • C10 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - General

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