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How to shake the Invisible Hand (when Robinson meets Friday)

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  • Antoine Billot

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres)

Abstract

We propose to define the invisible hand by (i) modelling the mechanism itself (not to just assume its existence) and (ii) making explicit the limit conditions for its working. For that purpose, we simply assimilate the working of the invisible hand mechanism to the existence of a social preference such that individual and social optimalities are consistent. In introducing the possibility of interaction among individuals, we then suggest that the standard Robinson case or social atomicity is just a degenerate feature of a more general requirement that we call the Global Network Agreement. Our main result is that the invisible hand mechanism does keep on working when there is an interaction between Robinson and Friday if the former (resp. the latter) is sensitive to the latter (resp. the former) in such a way that they exhibit some agreement in preferences. Hence, the Robinson case naturally satisfies this property since nor Robinson neither Friday can disagree with himself. But more cooperative situations are also allowed in order to extent the invisible hand mechanism to cases with interactions.

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Billot, 2007. "How to shake the Invisible Hand (when Robinson meets Friday)," PSE Working Papers halshs-00588081, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00588081
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00588081
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Billot, Antoine, 2003. "How Liberalism Kills Democracy or Sen's Theorem Revisited," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 247-270, September.
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    11. Billot, Antoine & Walliser, Bernard, 1999. "Epistemic properties of knowledge hierarchies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 185-205, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Anjan Mukherji, 2012. "The second fundamental theorem of positive economics," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 125-138, June.
    2. Antoine Billot, 2011. "Are Choice Rationality and Social Consistency Two Sides of a Same Coin?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 239-254, March.

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    Keywords

    invisible hand; social interaction; preferences;
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