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How Liberalism Kills Democracy or Sen's Theorem Revisited

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  • Antoine Billot

    (LATEC - Laboratoire d'Analyse et de Techniques Economiques [URA 342] - UB - Université de Bourgogne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

First, a general qualification rule based on individual preferences is proposed which allows any given coalition to distinguish among its members some individuals who are said to be qualified by it since sensitive in preferences with all individuals of this coalition. A particular qualification rule, the liberal one, is then introduced as a rule conferring the power to qualify or disqualify any individual on the individual himself. Now, since each preference property corresponds to a qualification property, the liberal qualification rule is precisely characterized by individual preferences. Second, a delegator, that is a mapping describing a subset of delegates within the society, is defined to justify the standard notion of decisiveness. The idea of delegation allows us to generalize Arrow-Sen framework. This is done by means of a collective rationality postulate such that a coalition must be competent, i.e. includes all delegates, to be decisive. Then, we prove that (1) there exists a delegate who is qualified by any coalition he belongs to, (2) such a delegate is a dictator iff the qualification rule is liberal, (3) the qualification rule is liberal iff the preferences are selfish. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Antoine Billot, 2003. "How Liberalism Kills Democracy or Sen's Theorem Revisited," Post-Print hal-04103103, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04103103
    DOI: 10.1023/a:1024889025383
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    Cited by:

    1. Alcantud, José Carlos R. & Laruelle, Annick, 2018. "Collective identity functions with status quo," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 159-166.
    2. Dimitrov, Dinko & Sung, Shao Chin & Xu, Yongsheng, 2007. "Procedural group identification," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 137-146, September.
    3. Antoine Billot, 2009. "How to shake the invisible hand (when Robinson meets Friday)," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 5(3), pages 257-270, September.
    4. Antoine Billot, 2007. "Social consistency and individual rationality," PSE Working Papers halshs-00588078, HAL.
    5. Antoine Billot, 2011. "Are Choice Rationality and Social Consistency Two Sides of a Same Coin?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 239-254, March.
    6. Dimitrov, D.A. & Sung, S.C., 2003. "On the Axiomatic Characterization of "Who is a J?"," Discussion Paper 2003-89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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