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Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvain Béal

    (CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne)

  • Jacques Durieu

    (CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne)

  • Philippe Solal

    (CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne)

Abstract

We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TUgames. Chwe (1994, p.318) notes that, in this context, it is difficult to prove nonemptiness of the largest consistent set. We show that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set. Moreover, the proof of this result points out that each TU-game has a farsighted stable set. We go further by providing a characterization of the collection of farsighted stable sets in TU-games. We also show that the farsighted core of a TU-game is empty or is equal to the set of imputations of the game. Next, the relationships between the core and the largest consistent set are studied in superadditive TU-games and in clan games. In the last section, we explore the stability of the Shapley value. It is proved that the Shapley value of a superadditive TU-game is always a stable imputation: it is a core imputation or it constitutes a farsighted stable set. A necessary and sufficient condition for a superadditive TU-game to have the Shapley value in the largest consistent set is given.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Béal & Jacques Durieu & Philippe Solal, 2007. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability in TU-Games," Post-Print ujm-00176488, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:ujm-00176488
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kimya, Mert, 2020. "Equilibrium coalitional behavior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), May.
    2. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2015. "The Farsighted Stable Set," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(3), pages 977-1011, May.
    3. Gedai, Endre & Kóczy, László Á. & Zombori, Zita, 2012. "Cluster games: A novel, game theory-based approach to better understand incentives and stability in clusters," MPRA Paper 65095, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Toshiyuki Hirai, 2018. "Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1087-1111, November.
    5. Shino, Junnosuke & Kawasaki, Ryo, 2012. "Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling’s location games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 23-30.
    6. Béal, Sylvain & Rémila, Eric & Solal, Philippe, 2010. "On the number of blocks required to access the core," MPRA Paper 26578, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Talamàs, Eduard, 2018. "Fair stable sets of simple games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 574-584.
    8. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    9. Kawasaki, Ryo & Sato, Takashi & Muto, Shigeo, 2015. "Farsightedly stable tariffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 118-124.
    10. Xiaozhou Xu & Shenle Pan & Eric Ballot, 2012. "Allocation of Transportation Cost & CO2 Emission in Pooled Supply Chains Using Cooperative Game Theory," Post-Print hal-00733491, HAL.
    11. Kawasaki, Ryo, 2015. "Maximin, minimax, and von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stable sets," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 8-12.
    12. Anindya Bhattacharya & Victoria Brosi, 2011. "An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 393-401, May.
    13. Aivazian, Varouj A. & Callen, Jeffrey L., 2023. "The Coase Theorem and the empty core: Inspecting the entrails after four decades," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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