The emergence of hybrid co-regulation: empirical evidence and rationale in the field of e-waste management

According to Michel Foucault, neoliberal governmentality is closely linked to the issue of making individuals responsible (Foucault et al., 2010; Hache, 2007). In this perspective, unilateral public action (command and control) is considered not only inefficient but also illegitimate, and shall be replaced by different government techniques and governance methods aiming at making them responsible (accountable) and equip them with new capabilities (empowerment). Thus, the State does not give up its regulation power but make it change towards more negotiated forms of governance, based on flexible and incentive instruments. This phenomenon has been labeled hybrid regulation to capture the idea that complementary forms of public and private regulations coexist in transnational governance (Levi-Faur, 2011; Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). However, under this label, heterogeneous practices have been developed, with different degree of hybridization (Cafaggi, 2012), ranging from forms of loose co-shaping between private and public regulations to stronger co-regulation where explicit governance structures are purposefully set to organize role-plays and subsidiarity rules between the different parties. This paper addresses the latter form of hybrid regulation in the e-waste sector where such a policy has been implemented in Europe based on the concept of extended producer responsibility. We analyze the rationale for such a policy and its implementation in practice.