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L'organisation du marché européen des services de transport aérien face à la suppression annoncée des exemptions

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  • Florent Venayre

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

  • Thierry Blayac

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

Abstract

Du fait de son histoire et de ses spécificités, le marché européen du transport aérien a toujours fait l'objet d'un traitement particulier des autorités concurrentielles communautaires. Cependant, l'adoption récente par la Commission européenne d'un nouveau règlement annonce la suppression des accords d'exemption dont bénéficiaient jusqu'ici les compagnies aériennes. Compte tenu de ces nouvelles dispositions, nous nous interrogeons dans cet article sur les modifications à venir de l'organisation du marché européen des services de transport aérien, et particulièrement sur le devenir des coordinations horaire et tarifaire. La coordination horaire est en effet indispensable à l'obtention d'un niveau satisfaisant du surplus des consommateurs. Si la Commission européenne reconnaît bien ses vertus, le cadre juridique dans lequel cette forme de coordination sera évaluée n'en change pas moins, et il convient en conséquence de veiller à ce que les incitations des compagnies aériennes à coordonner leurs vols restent fortes. Concernant la coordination tarifaire, les risques anticoncurrentiels sont évidemment beaucoup plus élevés, ce qui justifie pleinement la suspicion des autorités à l'égard de ces mécanismes. Pour autant, cette coordination tarifaire comprend aussi des éléments favorables au bien-être des consommateurs, et surtout ce que nous avons appelé le " guichet unique " (la possibilité pour le consommateur en interligne de bénéficier d'un unique interlocuteur lors de la commercialisation des billets et des services qui en découlent), qui doit impérativement être préservé, d'une manière ou d'une autre.

Suggested Citation

  • Florent Venayre & Thierry Blayac, 2007. "L'organisation du marché européen des services de transport aérien face à la suppression annoncée des exemptions," Post-Print halshs-00645382, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00645382
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00645382
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    References listed on IDEAS

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