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FAIRE DES DIRIGEANTS DES ACTIONNAIRES, POUR QUELLE EFFICACITE ? Une expérimentation sur l'impact des systèmes d'incitation sur la création de valeur actionnariale

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Mottis

    (ESSEC Business School)

  • Philippe Zarlowski

    (ESSEC Business School)

Abstract

Basé sur une expérimentation, cet article porte sur la relation entre systèmes de mesure des performances et d'incitation dans le cadre de la gestion par la valeur. La discussion porte sur l'analyse des résultats et sur les comportements observés. Elle illustre quelques effets inattendus induits par les deux schémas d'incitation retenus.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Mottis & Philippe Zarlowski, 2002. "FAIRE DES DIRIGEANTS DES ACTIONNAIRES, POUR QUELLE EFFICACITE ? Une expérimentation sur l'impact des systèmes d'incitation sur la création de valeur actionnariale," Post-Print halshs-00584512, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00584512
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00584512
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    3. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691.
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    5. Madden, Bartley, 1999. "CFROI Valuation," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780750638654.
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