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Hybrid Organizations

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  • Claude Ménard

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper focuses on forms that involve multiple partners pooling some strategic decision rights and even some property rights while keeping distinct ownership over key assets, so that they require specific governance to monitor and discipline their interactions. I identify these arrangements as 'hybrid organisations', in line with the terminology proposed by Oliver Williamson (1996). In the second section I go farther in identifying and delineating these arrangements. The third section discusses the forces at work that may explain why parties accept to share strategic rights. The fourth section exhibits different mechanisms of coordination that may play distinctly or in combination. The fifth section suggests a typology of hybrid organisations based on the prevalence of each different mechanism. The final section concludes by emphasising problems raised by the very existence of hybrids, particularly with respect to competition policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Ménard, 2011. "Hybrid Organizations," Post-Print halshs-00556728, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00556728
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00556728
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
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