Physicians self selection of a payment mechanism: Capitation versus fee-for-service
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- Marie Allard & Izabela Jelovac & Pierre-Thomas Léger, 2010. "Physicians self selection of a payment mechanism: Capitation versus fee-for-service," Working Papers 1024, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
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Cited by:
- Allard, Marie & Jelovac, Izabela & Léger, Pierre Thomas, 2011.
"Treatment and referral decisions under different physician payment mechanisms,"
Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 880-893.
- Marie Allard & Izabela Jelovac & Pierre-Thomas Léger, 2011. "Treatment and referral decisions under different physician payment mechanisms," Post-Print halshs-00650933, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
GPs; gatekeeping; payment scheme; self selection; ability; professional duty;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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