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Overview of Infrastructure Charging, part 4, IMPROVERAIL Project Deliverable 9, “Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems”

Author

Listed:
  • Dominique Bouf

    (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Yves Crozet

    (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Sophie Masson

    (GEREM - Groupe d'Étude et de Recherche en Économie Mathématique - UPVD - Université de Perpignan Via Domitia)

  • Pierre-Yves Péguy

    (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Stéphanie Souche

    (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bjørnar Andreas Kvinge

    (TOI - Transportøkonomisk institutt - Transportøkonomisk institutt)

  • Ioan Cuncev

    (INCERTRANS - Institutulde Cercetari in Transporturi - Institutulde Cercetari in Transporturi)

  • Paola Cossu

    (FIT - Finance Innovation Transport srl - Finance Innovation Transport srl)

  • Henning Tegner

    (TUB - Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin)

Abstract

Improverail aims are to further support the establishment of railway infrastructure management in accordance with Directive 91/440, as well as the new railway infrastructure directives, by developing the necessary tools for modelling the management of railway infrastructure; by evaluating improved methods for capacity and resources management, which allow the improvement of the Life Cycle Costs (LCC) calculating methods, including elements related to vehicle - infrastructure interaction and external costs; and by improving data background in support of charging for use of railway infrastructure. To achieve these objectives, Improverail is organised along 8 workpackages, with specific objectives, responding to the requirements of the task 2.2.1/10 of the 2nd call made in the 5th RTD Framework Programme in December 1999.This part is the task 7.1 (Review of infrastructure charging systems) to the workpackage 7 (Analysis of the relation between infrastructure cost variation and diversity of infrastructure charging systems).Before explaining the economic characteristics of railway and his basic pricing principles, authors must specify the objectives of railways infrastructure charging.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Bouf & Yves Crozet & Sophie Masson & Pierre-Yves Péguy & Stéphanie Souche & Bjørnar Andreas Kvinge & Ioan Cuncev & Paola Cossu & Henning Tegner, 2003. "Overview of Infrastructure Charging, part 4, IMPROVERAIL Project Deliverable 9, “Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems”," Post-Print halshs-00142744, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00142744
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00142744
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    References listed on IDEAS

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