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An experimental comparison of contributions in collective prevention games and public goods games

Author

Listed:
  • Véronique Flambard

    (LITL - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire des transitions de Lille - UCL FGES - Université Catholique de Lille - Faculté de gestion, économie et sciences - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - JUNIA - JUNIA - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Grant MacEwan College, CRESGE - Centre de recherches économiques sociologiques et de gestion [Lille] - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, UCL FGES - Université Catholique de Lille - Faculté de gestion, économie et sciences - ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, ICL - Institut Catholique de Lille - UCL - Université catholique de Lille, UCL - Université catholique de Lille)

  • Fabrice Le Lec

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Rustam Romaniuc

    (LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

In many collective action problems individuals' contributions increase the probability of a collectively favorable event rather than affect the quantity of public goods provided. Such problems, that we refer to as collective prevention games, remain largely unexplored in the literature. We fill this gap by setting up an experiment where subjects' contributions increase the probability of a fixed collective benefit or reduce the probability of a fixed negative externality. Our main result is a substantial increase in cooperation in the probabilistic loss environment compared to the deterministic one. We explore some behavioral mechanisms that could drive this result.

Suggested Citation

  • Véronique Flambard & Fabrice Le Lec & Rustam Romaniuc, 2024. "An experimental comparison of contributions in collective prevention games and public goods games," Post-Print hal-04816166, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04816166
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13236
    as

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