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Until Death Do Us Part?: The Economics of Short-Term Marriage Contracts

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  • Stefania Marcassa

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université)

  • Grégory Ponthière

Abstract

"Until death do us part". Common wisdom considers that marriages will last forever, as the default length of a marriage is the total remaining lifespan of the spouses. This paper aims at questioning the prevailing marriage contracts, by exploring the conditions under which short-term contracts would be more desirable. Using a two-period collective household model, we show that, under a large interval of values for household production technology parameters and individual preference parameters, short-term marriage contracts, if available, would dominate long-term contracts. Moreover, the recent equalization of bargaining power within the household is shown to make short-term contracts even more desirable than in the past.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Stefania Marcassa & Grégory Ponthière, 2014. "Until Death Do Us Part?: The Economics of Short-Term Marriage Contracts," Post-Print hal-03677664, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03677664
    DOI: 10.1353/prv.2014.0001
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-454, June.
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    5. Niko Matouschek & Imran Rasul, 2008. "The Economics of the Marriage Contract: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(1), pages 59-110, February.
    6. Dnes,Antony W. & Rowthorn,Robert (ed.), 2002. "The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521809337, September.
    7. Harris, Milton & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1987. "On the Duration of Agreements," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(2), pages 389-406, June.
    8. Hamilton, Gillian, 1999. "Property Rights and Transaction Costs in Marriage: Evidence from Prenuptial Contracts," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 68-103, March.
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