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Le rendement des dépenses électorales en France

Author

Listed:
  • Martial Foucault
  • Abel François

    (LARGE - Laboratoire de recherche en gestion et économie - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - L'europe en mutation : histoire, droit, économie et identités culturelles - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This article aims at evaluating the influence of campaign spending on legislative vote share within a new French campaign finance law. From an empirical analysis derived from the 1997 French legislative election, we show that the electoral outcomes are sensitive to campaign spending. Using ols and 2SLS methods and taking into account the bias of endogeneity, we demonstrate that the spending of incumbent candidates have a direct and positive effect whereas the spending of their challengers have an indirect and negative effect. In the context of the implementation of a new campaign finance regulation (characterized by both spending ceiling and public repayment), this result means that financial barriers to entry into political market are not entirely reduced. In conclusion, the return of French campaign spending is not quite different from those empirically verified within the American electoral process.

Suggested Citation

  • Martial Foucault & Abel François, 2005. "Le rendement des dépenses électorales en France," Post-Print hal-03459034, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03459034
    DOI: 10.3917/reco.565.1125
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03459034
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Éric Dubois, 2007. "Les déterminants économiques du vote 1976-2006 : trente ans de fonctions de vote en France," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 117(2), pages 243-270.
    2. Riako Granzier & Vincent Pons & Clemence Tricaud, 2023. "Coordination and Bandwagon Effects: How Past Rankings Shape the Behavior of Voters and Candidates," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 177-217, October.
    3. Vincent Pons & Clémence Tricaud, 2018. "Expressive Voting and Its Cost: Evidence From Runoffs With Two or Three Candidates," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(5), pages 1621-1649, September.
    4. Abel François & Michael Visser & Lionel Wilner, 2022. "The petit effect of campaign spending on votes: using political financing reforms to measure spending impacts in multiparty elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 29-57, July.

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