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Does kin discrimination promote cooperation?

Author

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  • Gonçalo Faria

    (IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, School of Biology [University of St Andrews] - University of St Andrews [Scotland])

  • Andy Gardner

    (School of Biology [University of St Andrews] - University of St Andrews [Scotland])

Abstract

Genetic relatedness is a key driver of the evolution of cooperation. One mechanism that may ensure social partners are genetically related is kin discrimination, in which individuals are able to distinguish kin from non-kin and adjust their behaviour accordingly. However, the impact of kin discrimination upon the overall level of cooperation remains obscure. Specifically, while kin discrimination allows an individual to help more-related social partners over less-related social partners, it is unclear whether and how the population average level of cooperation that is evolutionarily favoured should differ under kin discrimination versus indiscriminate social behaviour. Here, we perform a general mathematical analysis in order to assess whether, when and in which direction kin discrimination changes the average level of cooperation in an evolving population. We find that kin discrimination may increase, decrease or leave unchanged the average level of cooperation, depending upon whether the optimal level of cooperation is a convex, concave or linear function of genetic relatedness. We develop an extension of the classic ‘tragedy of the commons' model of cooperation in order to provide an illustration of these results. Our analysis provides a method to guide future research on the evolutionary consequences of kin discrimination.

Suggested Citation

  • Gonçalo Faria & Andy Gardner, 2020. "Does kin discrimination promote cooperation?," Post-Print hal-03048825, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03048825
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03048825
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(4), pages 309-309.
    2. Markus Zöttl & Dik Heg & Noémie Chervet & Michael Taborsky, 2013. "Kinship reduces alloparental care in cooperative cichlids where helpers pay-to-stay," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 4(1), pages 1-9, June.
    3. Sarah E. Reece & Damien R. Drew & Andy Gardner, 2008. "Sex ratio adjustment and kin discrimination in malaria parasites," Nature, Nature, vol. 453(7195), pages 609-614, May.
    4. Okasha, Samir, 2012. "Social Justice, Genomic Justice And The Veil Of Ignorance: Harsanyi Meets Mendel," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(1), pages 43-71, March.
    5. Pau Carazo & Cedric K. W. Tan & Felicity Allen & Stuart Wigby & Tommaso Pizzari, 2014. "Within-group male relatedness reduces harm to females in Drosophila," Nature, Nature, vol. 505(7485), pages 672-675, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas W. Scott & Alan Grafen & Stuart A. West, 2022. "Multiple social encounters can eliminate Crozier’s paradox and stabilise genetic kin recognition," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 13(1), pages 1-19, December.

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