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From Highway to Clubs: Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods

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  • Alain Marciano

    (MRE - Montpellier Recherche en Economie - UM - Université de Montpellier, UM - Université de Montpellier, MRE - Montpellier Recherche en Economie - UM - Université de Montpellier)

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  • Alain Marciano, 2018. "From Highway to Clubs: Buchanan and the Pricing of Public Goods," Post-Print hal-02550420, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02550420
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3_32
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02550420
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marciano, Alain, 2016. "Buchanan’S Non-Coercive Economics For Self-Interested Individuals: Ethics, Small Groups, And The Social Contract," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-20, March.
    2. Marianne Johnson, 2015. "Public Goods, Market Failure, and Voluntary Exchange," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 47(5), pages 174-198, Supplemen.
    3. Alain Marciano, 2019. "Buchanan and public finance: The tennessee years," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(1), pages 21-46, March.
    4. Julius Margolis, 1957. "Welfare Criteria, Pricing and Decentralization of a Public Service," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 71(3), pages 448-463.
    5. Richard Abel Musgrave, 1939. "The Voluntary Exchange Theory of Public Economy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 53(2), pages 213-237.
    6. Otto A. Davis & Andrew Whinston, 1962. "Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(3), pages 241-241.
    7. J. Wiseman, 1957. "The Theory Of Public Utility Price—An Empty Box," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 56-74.
    8. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    9. James M. Buchanan, 1962. "Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 10, pages 204-218, Palgrave Macmillan.
    10. James M. Buchanan, 1949. "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(6), pages 496-496.
    11. Gordon Tullock, 1959. "Problems of Majority Voting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 67(6), pages 571-571.
    12. O. H. Brownlee, 1961. "User Prices versus Taxes," NBER Chapters, in: Public Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization, pages 421-438, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Silvestri, 2021. "Percentage tax designation institutions. On Sugden’s contractarian account," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 68(1), pages 101-130, March.
    2. Kuehn, Daniel, 2021. "James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and the “Radically Irresponsible” One Person, One Vote Decisions," OSF Preprints zetq4, Center for Open Science.

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