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La privatisation de l'eau en Afrique: une aubaine ?

Author

Listed:
  • Anne Briand

    (LASTA - Laboratoire d'Analyse des Sociétés, Transformations et Adaptations - UNIROUEN - Université de Rouen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université)

  • Arnaud Lemaître

Abstract

La privatisation de la distribution de l'eau potable en Afrique apparaît d'une part, au vue de la théorie économique et d'autre part, au vue de l'échec des États à assurer le service, comme favorable à l'extension du réseau pour tous à un prix bien moindre que celui exercé sur le segment informel. Cependant, il convient de s'interroger sur la capacité d'un secteur privé (dont la logique conduit à une maximisation du profit) à assurer convenablement les missions de service public qui lui sont attribuées. Nous observons dans un premier temps les éléments que peut nous apporter la littérature économique sur des éventuelles dérives (pouvoir de marché), et dans un second temps, nous analysons sous un angle critique les modèles du Nord (britannique et français) pour en déduire un certain nombre de recommandations tarifaires pour l'Afrique. JEL Classification : L33, L43, L95, O55

Suggested Citation

  • Anne Briand & Arnaud Lemaître, 2004. "La privatisation de l'eau en Afrique: une aubaine ?," Post-Print hal-02430316, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02430316
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02430316
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    eau; distribution; pouvoir de marché; privatisation; pauvreté;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa

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