Mieux-être au travail : gadget RH ou vrai levier de performance pour les entreprises ?
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- Michael Kosfeld & Armin Falk, 2006.
"The Hidden Costs of Control,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December.
- Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, "undated". "The Hidden Costs of Control," IEW - Working Papers 250, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
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- Chiara Lai & Maria Ianeva & Marc-Eric Bobillier Chaumon & Audrey Abitan, 2021. "Understanding the appropriation of activity-based workplaces throughout a situated perspective [Une perspective située pour penser l’appropriation des espaces de travail « par activités »]," Post-Print hal-03668892, HAL.
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