IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-01793701.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Incentives for productivity, efficiency and usefulness in public sector research : the process involved and their possible failures
[Les mécanismes d'incitation à la productivité, à l'efficience et à l'utilité dans la recherche publique. Une analyse des processus en jeu et de leurs défaillances possibles]

Author

Listed:
  • Sylvie Bonny

    (ECO-PUB - Economie Publique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech, INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

Using agency/contract theory, among other tools, this paper analyses the mechanisms that coordinate public sector research with social demand. The characteristics of public sector research and the importance of informational asymmetry in this field are outlined. The various incentive mechanisms that can ensure a certain level of productivity and efficiency from public sector research workers are examined (pressure to publish, priority rule, competition, etc.), with their advantages and disadvantages (over-specialization of scientists and the very narrow focus of most research, for example). The questions "whom is public research useful to?" and "what is the direction of the work?" are then examined. The issues of the circulation of knowledge and property law in this field are also discussed, as well as utilization of science results. In the conclusion some pointers are mentioned to improve the mechanisms that coordinate research and society.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvie Bonny, 1997. "Incentives for productivity, efficiency and usefulness in public sector research : the process involved and their possible failures [Les mécanismes d'incitation à la productivité, à l'efficience et," Post-Print hal-01793701, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01793701
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01793701
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-01793701/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    3. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Partha Dasgupta & Paul A. David, 1987. "Information Disclosure and the Economics of Science and Technology," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: George R. Feiwel (ed.), Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory, chapter 16, pages 519-542, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    6. Dominique Foray, 1991. "Economie et politique de la science: les développements théoriques récents," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 6(4), pages 53-87.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Antonelli, Cristiano, 2004. "To Use or To Sell Technological Knowledge," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis LEI & BRICK - Laboratory of Economics of Innovation "Franco Momigliano", Bureau of Research in Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge, Collegio 200405, University of Turin.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
    3. Curtiss, Jarmila, 2012. "Determinants of Financial Capital Use: Review of theories and implications for rural businesses," Factor Markets Working Papers 123, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    4. Todorova, Tamara, 2020. "Multinational Corporations and Transaction Costs," EconStor Books, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 222987.
    5. Teece, David J., 2010. "Technological Innovation and the Theory of the Firm," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 679-730, Elsevier.
    6. Paula E. Stephan, 2004. "Robert K. Merton's perspective on priority and the provision of the public good knowledge," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 60(1), pages 81-87, May.
    7. Oliver Falck & Anita Fichtl & Tobias Lohse & Friederike Welter & Heike Belitz & Cedric von der Hellen & Carsten Dreher & Carsten Schwäbe & Dietmar Harhoff & Monika Schnitzer & Uschi Backes-Gellner & C, 2019. "Steuerliche Forschungsförderung: Wichtiger Impuls für FuE-Aktivitäten oder zu wenig zielgerichtet?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 72(09), pages 03-25, May.
    8. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    9. Leonard, David K. & Bloom, Gerald & Hanson, Kara & O’Farrell, Juan & Spicer, Neil, 2013. "Institutional Solutions to the Asymmetric Information Problem in Health and Development Services for the Poor," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 71-87.
    10. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
    11. Magnus Henrekson & Anders Kärnä & Tino Sanandaji, 2022. "Schumpeterian entrepreneurship: coveted by policymakers but impervious to top-down policymaking," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 867-890, July.
    12. Carayol, Nicolas & Dalle, Jean-Michel, 2007. "Sequential problem choice and the reward system in Open Science," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 167-191, June.
    13. George A Shinkle & Jo-Ann Suchard, 2019. "Innovation in newly public firms: The influence of government grants, venture capital, and private equity," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 44(2), pages 248-281, May.
    14. Valérie Revest & Alessandro Sapio, 2012. "Financing technology-based small firms in Europe: what do we know?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 179-205, July.
    15. Bronwyn Hall, 2004. "The financing of research and development," Chapters, in: Anthony Bartzokas & Sunil Mani (ed.), Financial Systems, Corporate Investment in Innovation, and Venture Capital, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Paul A. David, 2005. "The Economic Logic of “Open Science” and the Balance between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and," Development and Comp Systems 0502006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Olga Plesco & Ludmila Sobol, 2013. "The Issue Of Asymmetric Information Upon The Capital Market," CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 5(2), pages 254-266.
    18. Alexander Galetovic & Ángel Cabrera, "undated". "Tópicos en la Economía de la Investigación Tecnológica," Documentos de Trabajo 121, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    19. Chan, Edwin H.W. & Qian, Queena K. & Lam, Patrick T.I., 2009. "The market for green building in developed Asian cities--the perspectives of building designers," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 3061-3070, August.
    20. Paul David, 2001. "From Keeping Natures Secrets to the Institutionalization of Open Science," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _023, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01793701. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.