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Excess Control, Agency Costs and the Probability of Going Private in France

Author

Listed:
  • Mohamed Belkhir

    (college of business and economics)

  • Sabri Boubaker
  • Wael Rouatbi

    (IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12)

Abstract

The current study investigates the determinants of going private (GP) in France. It contrasts a sample of 161 firms that went private between 1997 and 2009 with a propensity-score-matched sample of firms that remained public during the same period. The results indicate that, unlike for firms that remain public, the largest controlling shareholders (LCSs) of GP firms control their firms using an incommensurately small fraction of ultimate cash flow rights. This is consistent with the view that agency problems between large and minority shareholders make public firms less attractive to investors, which reduces the benefits of staying public and encourages the LCSs to take their firms private or accept takeover offers. Additional results show that GP firms have more undervalued stock prices and higher free cash flows than non-GP firms. Expected interest tax shields, low growth opportunities, and pre-GP takeover interest do not seem to affect the probability of GP.

Suggested Citation

  • Mohamed Belkhir & Sabri Boubaker & Wael Rouatbi, 2013. "Excess Control, Agency Costs and the Probability of Going Private in France," Post-Print hal-01155496, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01155496
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zeineb Barka & Taher Hamza, 2020. "The effect of large controlling shareholders on equity prices in France: monitoring or entrenchment?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(3), pages 769-798, September.
    2. Hu, Gang & Lin, Ji-Chai & Wong, Owen & Yu, Manning, 2019. "Why have many U.S.-listed Chinese firms announced delisting recently?," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 13-31.
    3. Oded Cohen, 2020. "Does Investor Protection Regulation Induce Poorly Governed Firms to Go Private?," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2020.07, Bank of Israel.
    4. Dasilas, Apostolos & Grose, Chris, 2018. "The wealth effects of public-to-private LBOs: Evidence from Europe," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 179-194.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Going private; Ownership structure; Large shareholders; Corporate governance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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