Mohamed Belkhir
Personal Details
First Name: | Mohamed |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Belkhir |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pbe1242 |
| |
Affiliation
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Washington, District of Columbia (United States)http://www.imf.org/
RePEc:edi:imfffus (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers ArticlesWorking papers
- Mohamed Belkhir & Sabri Boubaker & Derouiche Imen, 2014.
"Control–ownership wedge, board of directors, and the value of excess cash,"
Post-Print
hal-01155486, HAL.
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubaker, Sabri & Derouiche, Imen, 2014. "Control–ownership wedge, board of directors, and the value of excess cash," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 110-122.
- Mohamed Belkhir & Sabri Boubaker & Wael Rouatbi, 2013.
"Excess Control, Agency Costs and the Probability of Going Private in France,"
Post-Print
hal-01155496, HAL.
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubaker, Sabri & Rouatbi, Wael, 2013. "Excess control, agency costs and the probability of going private in France," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 250-265.
- Mohamed Belkhir & Sabri Boubaker, 2013.
"CEO inside debt and hedging decisions: Lessons from the U.S. banking industry,"
Post-Print
hal-01155502, HAL.
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubaker, Sabri, 2013. "CEO inside debt and hedging decisions: Lessons from the U.S. banking industry," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 223-246.
- Mohamed Belkhir, 2006.
"Board structure, Ownership structure, and Firm performance : Evidence from Banking,"
Working Papers
halshs-00009115, HAL.
- Mohamed BELKHIR, 2006. "Board structure, Ownership structure, and Firm performance : Evidence from banking," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 277, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
- Mohamed Belkhir, 2005. "Additional Evidence on Insider Ownership and Bank Risk-Taking," Post-Print halshs-00007674, HAL.
Articles
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Saad, Mohsen & Samet, Anis, 2020. "Stock extreme illiquidity and the cost of capital," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Grira, Jocelyn & Hassan, M. Kabir & Soumaré, Issouf, 2019. "Islamic banks and political risk: International evidence," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 39-55.
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubakri, Narjess & Grira, Jocelyn, 2017. "Political risk and the cost of capital in the MENA region," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 155-172.
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Ben-Nasr, Hamdi, 2016. "Labor protection and the privatization or partial privatization method," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 305-322.
- Awartani, Basel & Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubaker, Sabri & Maghyereh, Aktham, 2016. "Corporate debt maturity in the MENA region: Does institutional quality matter?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 309-325.
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Ben-Nasr, Hamdi & Boubaker, Sabri, 2016. "Labor protection and corporate Debt maturity: International evidence," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 134-149.
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Maghyereh, Aktham & Awartani, Basel, 2016. "Institutions and corporate capital structure in the MENA region," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 99-129.
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubaker, Sabri & Derouiche, Imen, 2014.
"Control–ownership wedge, board of directors, and the value of excess cash,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 110-122.
- Mohamed Belkhir & Sabri Boubaker & Derouiche Imen, 2014. "Control–ownership wedge, board of directors, and the value of excess cash," Post-Print hal-01155486, HAL.
- Belkhir, Mohamed, 2013. "Do subordinated debt holders discipline bank risk-taking? Evidence from risk management decisions," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 705-719.
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubaker, Sabri & Rouatbi, Wael, 2013.
"Excess control, agency costs and the probability of going private in France,"
Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 250-265.
- Mohamed Belkhir & Sabri Boubaker & Wael Rouatbi, 2013. "Excess Control, Agency Costs and the Probability of Going Private in France," Post-Print hal-01155496, HAL.
- Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubaker, Sabri, 2013.
"CEO inside debt and hedging decisions: Lessons from the U.S. banking industry,"
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 223-246.
- Mohamed Belkhir & Sabri Boubaker, 2013. "CEO inside debt and hedging decisions: Lessons from the U.S. banking industry," Post-Print hal-01155502, HAL.
- Mohamed Belkhir & Abdelaziz Chazi, 2010. "Compensation Vega, Deregulation, and Risk‐Taking: Lessons from the US Banking Industry," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9‐10), pages 1218-1247, November.
- Mohamed Belkhir, 2009.
"Board of directors' size and performance in the banking industry,"
International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 5(2), pages 201-221, April.
RePEc:taf:apfiec:v:19:y:2009:i:19:p:1581-1593 is not listed on IDEAS
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