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Undervaluation, private information, agency costs and the decision to go private

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  • C. Weir
  • D. Laing
  • M. Wright

Abstract

There is widespread anecdotal evidence that poor stock market performance is an important reason for taking a company private. The results support the perceived undervaluation hypothesis. The finding also applies to management buy-outs, which indicates that the management of these firms had private information. It is also found that firms going private had non-optimal governance structures, higher board and institutional ownership. The last finding is consistent with going private transactions providing institutions with a means of existing firms with poor market valuation, particularly during a time of very limited pressure from the market for corporate control.

Suggested Citation

  • C. Weir & D. Laing & M. Wright, 2005. "Undervaluation, private information, agency costs and the decision to go private," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(13), pages 947-961.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apfiec:v:15:y:2005:i:13:p:947-961
    DOI: 10.1080/09603100500278221
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, 1989. "Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 771-787, July.
    2. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    3. Robert L. Kieschnick, Jr, 1998. "Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions Revisited," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1&2), pages 187-202.
    4. Jay Dahya & John J. McConnell & Nickolaos G. Travlos, 2002. "The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance, and Top Management Turnover," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 461-483, February.
    5. Charlie Weir & David Laing & Phillip J. McKnight, 2002. "Internal and External Governance Mechanisms: Their Impact on the Performance of Large UK Public Companies," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(5&6), pages 579-611.
    6. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:3:p:771-87 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Charlie Weir & David Laing & Phillip J. McKnight, 2002. "Internal and External Governance Mechanisms: Their Impact on the Performance of Large UK Public Companies," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(5‐6), pages 579-611.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Subhrendu Rath & Mamunur Rashid, 2016. "Undervaluation and private equity takeovers," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 41(4), pages 735-759, November.
    2. KAWANISHI Takuya, 2021. "Going-Private Transactions and Ex-Post Firm Behaviors: Evidence from Japanese Management Buyouts," Discussion papers 21067, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    3. Cumming, Douglas & Siegel, Donald S. & Wright, Mike, 2007. "Private equity, leveraged buyouts and governance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 439-460, September.
    4. Bajo, Emanuele & Barbi, Massimiliano & Bigelli, Marco & Hillier, David, 2013. "The role of institutional investors in public-to-private transactions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4327-4336.
    5. Charlie Weir & Peter Jones & Mike Wright, 2015. "Public to private transactions, private equity and financial health in the UK: an empirical analysis of the impact of going private," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(1), pages 91-112, February.
    6. Martin Bugeja & Kosta Sinelnikov, 2012. "Public versus private takeovers of Australian stock exchange listed targets," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 37(3), pages 391-414, December.
    7. Martinez, Isabelle & Serve, Stéphanie, 2011. "The delisting decision: The case of buyout offer with squeeze-out (BOSO)," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 228-239.
    8. Renneboog, Luc & Simons, Tomas & Wright, Mike, 2007. "Why do public firms go private in the UK? The impact of private equity investors, incentive realignment and undervaluation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 591-628, September.
    9. Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubaker, Sabri & Rouatbi, Wael, 2013. "Excess control, agency costs and the probability of going private in France," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 250-265.
    10. Hu, Gang & Lin, Ji-Chai & Wong, Owen & Yu, Manning, 2019. "Why have many U.S.-listed Chinese firms announced delisting recently?," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 13-31.
    11. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-605 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Aurélie Sannajust & Alexander Groh, 2023. "Pioneering management buy-out and entrepreneurial finance research: Mike Wright’s research legacy," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 1-35, January.
    13. Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Barbara Petracci & Massimo Spisni, 2015. "“Hit and Run” and “Revolving Doors”: evidence from the Italian stock market," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(2), pages 285-301, May.
    14. Mittoo, Usha & Ng, Dennis & Yan, Meng, 2020. "Managerial ownership, credit market conditions, undervaluation and offer premiums in management (MBOs) and leveraged buyouts (LBOs)," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    15. Patricia Maria Bortolon & Annor da Silva Junior, 2015. "Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues," Brazilian Business Review, Fucape Business School, vol. 0(2), pages 92-117, August.
    16. Thorsten Knauer & Friedrich Sommer, 2012. "Interest barrier rules as a response to highly leveraged transactions," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 11(2), pages 206-232, May.
    17. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-591 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Achleitner, Ann-Kristin & Andres, Christian & Betzer, André & Weir, Charlie, 2008. "Economic consequences of private equity investments on the German stock market," CEFS Working Paper Series 2008-05, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).
    19. Ann-Kristin Achleitner & Christian Andres & Andre Betzer & Charlie Weir, 2011. "Wealth effects of private equity investments on the German stock market," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(3), pages 217-239.
    20. Renneboog, Luc & Vansteenkiste, Cara, 2017. "Leveraged Buyouts : A Survey of the Literature," Other publications TiSEM 573ebdd5-a720-4110-8ed1-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    21. Constant Djama & Isabelle Martinez & Stéphanie Serve, 2012. "What do we know about delistings? A survey of the literature," Post-Print hal-00937899, HAL.
    22. Manuela Geranio & Giovanna Zanotti, 2012. "Equity Markets Do Not Fit All: an Analysis of Public†to†Private Deals in Continental Europe," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 18(5), pages 867-895, November.
    23. Domitilla Magni & Ottorino Morresi & Alberto Pezzi & Domenico Graziano, 2022. "Defining the Relationship Between Firm’s Performance and Delisting: Empirical Evidence of Going Private in Europe," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 13(3), pages 2584-2605, September.
    24. Kevin Levillain & Blanche Segrestin, 2016. "Entrepreneur’s Wealth vs. Firm’s Welfare: Exploring an “evergreen” governance for firm succession," Post-Print hal-01292956, HAL.
    25. Ettore Croci & Alfonso Del Giudice, 2014. "Delistings, Controlling Shareholders and Firm Performance in Europe," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 20(2), pages 374-405, March.

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