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Boycotting a dictatorship: who does it really hurt?

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  • Philippe Delacote

    (LEF - Laboratoire d'Economie Forestière - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - AgroParisTech)

Abstract

Consumer boycotts and international economic sanctions represent a frequent tool to protest against countries for their violation of human rights. This paper questions if such a kind of action hurts more the populations it is supposed to defend than governing classes it is targeting. Overall, boycotts of more rapacious regimes may decrease more the wellbeing of the population than the one of the governing class.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Delacote, 2009. "Boycotting a dictatorship: who does it really hurt?," Post-Print hal-01072322, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01072322
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01072322
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Edmonds, Eric V., 2008. "Child Labor," Handbook of Development Economics, in: T. Paul Schultz & John A. Strauss (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 57, pages 3607-3709, Elsevier.
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    5. Kaempfer, William H. & Lowenberg, Anton D., 2007. "The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 27, pages 867-911, Elsevier.
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    7. Sen, Amartya, 1979. "The Welfare Basis of Real Income Comparisons: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-45, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CONSUMER BOYCOTT; DICTATORIAL REGIMES; ECONOMIE DU BIEN-ETRE;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy

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