Equilibrium strategy and population-size effects in lowest unique bid auctions
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.088701
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Yamada, Takashi & Hanaki, Nobuyuki, 2016.
"An experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games,"
Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 463(C), pages 88-102.
- Takashi Yamada & Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2015. "An Experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-34, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Takashi Yamada & Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2016. "An Experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games," Post-Print halshs-01204814, HAL.
- Mohlin, Erik & Östling, Robert & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2020. "Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 225-245.
- Cancan Zhou & Hongguang Dong & Rui Hu & Qinghua Chen, 2015. "Smarter than Others? Conjectures in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(4), pages 1-13, April.
- Mohlin, Erik & Östling, Robert & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi, 2015. "Lowest unique bid auctions with population uncertainty," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 53-57.
- Berger, Ulrich & De Silva, Hannelore & Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde, 2016.
"Cognitive hierarchies in the minimizer game,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 337-348.
- Ulrich Berger & Hannelore De Silva & Gerlinde Fellner-Röhling, 2016. "Cognitive Hierarchies in the Minimizer Game," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp211, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Berger, Ulrich & De Silva, Hannelore & Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde, 2016. "Cognitive Hierarchies in the Minimizer Game," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 211, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
- Rui Hu & Jinzhong Guo & Qinghua Chen & Tao Zheng, 2017. "The Psychological Force Model for Lowest Unique Bid Auction," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 50(4), pages 655-667, December.
- Arvind Srinivasan & Burton Simon, 2024. "Exact asymptotics and continuous approximations for the Lowest Unique Positive Integer game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 653-671, June.
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