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An experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games

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  • Yamada, Takashi
  • Hanaki, Nobuyuki

Abstract

We experimentally study Lowest Unique Integer Games (LUIGs) to determine if and how subjects self-organize into different behavioral classes. In a LUIG, N(≥3) players submit a positive integer up to M and the player choosing the smallest number not chosen by anyone else wins. LUIGs are simplified versions of real systems such as Lowest/Highest Unique Bid Auctions that have been attracting attention from scholars, yet experimental studies are scarce. Furthermore, LUIGs offer insights into choice patterns that can shed light on the alleviation of congestion problems. Here, we consider four LUIGs with N={3,4} and M={3,4}. We find that (a) choices made by more than 1/3 of subjects were not significantly different from what a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MSE) predicts; however, (b) subjects who behaved significantly differently from what the MSE predicts won the game more frequently. What distinguishes subjects was their tendencies to change their choices following losses.

Suggested Citation

  • Yamada, Takashi & Hanaki, Nobuyuki, 2016. "An experiment on Lowest Unique Integer Games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 463(C), pages 88-102.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:463:y:2016:i:c:p:88-102
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2016.06.108
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lowest Unique Integer Game; Laboratory experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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