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Conflict Over Transnational River Resources: An Applied Game Theoretic Analysis

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  • Andrew Beckmann

    (University of Hawai'i and the East West Center)

Abstract

This paper presents a game theoretic model to analyze transnational river resource conflicts such as the Indus River Basin conflict between Pakistan and India. The model demonstrates that to obtain a share of the river resources from the upstream country downstream, the downstream country must purchase costly armaments to threaten an invasion. Yet in this process, the upstream country has a significant first-mover advantage in extracting the river resource as it can internalize the threat of invasion and prevent it from happening in the non-invasion equilibrium "Peace with Threat of War". When the upstream country does not internalize the threat of invasion from the downstream country, the invasion equilibrium "War" occurs. This paper discusses the implications of each equilibria in the model within the context of the Indus River Basin conflict. This paper also discusses the possibility of Pareto-improving cooperative outcomes by imposing new institutional frameworks.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Beckmann, 2018. "Conflict Over Transnational River Resources: An Applied Game Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 201806, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:201806
    as

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    File URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_18-06.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2018
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    India; Indus River Basin; International Conflict; Pakistan; Third-Party Arbitration; Transnational River;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements

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