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Land Confiscations and land reform in Natural-Order States

Author

Listed:
  • Sumner La Croix

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

Abstract

Social scientists argue that post-World War II land reforms in East Asia were critical ingredients in the region’s strong economic growth, but pay little attention to how large-scale land confiscations might affect the security of property rights in each country. A review of the history of large-scale land confiscations in early modern Europe, the United States and Hawai‘i provides a foundation for understanding the nature of modern land reform policies. The key insight is to recognize that East Asian states after World War II were natural state social orders in which new governments confiscate and redistribute property to bolster their coalition’s position and weaken opponents. In East Asia, land confiscations after World War II followed the pattern observed elsewhere, with victors taking and redistributing land from the losers of the war and subsequent civil wars primarily to bolster their newly installed political coalition and to maintain social order.

Suggested Citation

  • Sumner La Croix, 2014. "Land Confiscations and land reform in Natural-Order States," Working Papers 201406, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:201406
    as

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    File URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_14-6.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    property; revolution; war; land; confiscation; natural state; open-access order; limited-access order;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N51 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913

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