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Ask a local: Improving the public pricing of land titles in urban Tanzania

Author

Listed:
  • Tanner Regan

    (George Washington University)

  • Martina Manara

    (London School of Economics)

Abstract

Information on willingness-to-pay is key for public pricing and allocation of services but not easily collected. Studying land titles in Dar-es-Salaam, we ask whether local leaders know and will reveal plot owners' willingness-to-pay. We randomly assign leaders to predict under different settings then elicit owners' actual willingness-to-pay. Demand is substantial, but below exorbitant fees. Leaders can predict the aggregate demand curve and distinguish variation across owners. Predictions worsen when used to target subsidies, but adding cash incentives mitigates this. We demonstrate that leader-elicited information can improve the public pricing of title deeds, raising uptake while maintaining public funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Tanner Regan & Martina Manara, 2022. "Ask a local: Improving the public pricing of land titles in urban Tanzania," Working Papers 2022-07, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy.
    • Handle: RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2022-07
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Visser, Martine & le Roux, Leonard & Mulwa, Chalmers K. & Tibesigwa, Byela & Bezabih, Mintewab, 2024. "Adaptive investment with land tenure and weather risk: Behavioral evidence from Tanzania," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 217(C), pages 398-434.
    2. Manara, Martina & Pani, Erica, 2023. "Institutional pluralism and pro-poor land registration: Lessons on interim property rights from urban Tanzania," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    3. Manara, Martina & Pani, Erica, 2023. "Institutional pluralism and pro-poor land registration: lessons on interim property rights from urban Tanzania," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118651, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    property rights; willingness-to-pay; public pricing; local publicly provided goods;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • R21 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Housing Demand
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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