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Eliciting demand for title deeds: lab-in-the-field evidence from urban Tanzania

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  • Manara, Martina
  • Regan, Tanner

Abstract

Many African cities face extremely high rates of informal land ownership. Governments implement land titling projects to alleviate poverty and facilitate urban development in these unplanned and rapidly urbanizing cities. However, these programs often register low uptake. We suggest addressing this problem with a pricing strategy that elicits local demand for titles from community leaders. We study the demand for title deeds in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, where the fixed costs of surveying and planning have been covered, conducting two lab-in-the-field experiments with 90 local leaders and 146 property owners. Demand for property titles, as elicited by the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) method, while largely below current fees, is substantial. We then ask if local leaders can help predict this demand ex-ante. We find that leaders have accurate information about both the aggregate demand curve in their neighbourhoods, as well as, the ability to distinguish variation in willingness-to-pay across owners in their neighbourhood. Predictions of aggregate demand deteriorate under an environment where the responses of leaders are used to allocate subsidies, but an incentive scheme of cash prizes is able to mitigate this. To keep leaders from misreporting, an appropriately designed policy will compensate leaders for accuracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Manara, Martina & Regan, Tanner, 2020. "Eliciting demand for title deeds: lab-in-the-field evidence from urban Tanzania," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 107538, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:107538
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107538/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Manara, Martina & Regan, Tanner, 2022. "Ask a local: improving the public pricing of land titles in urban Tanzania," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 117856, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    property rights; willingness-to-pay; subsidy targeting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • R22 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Other Demand
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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