A Note on Renegotiation in Repeated Games [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327 360]
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- Günther, Michael & Kuzmics, Christoph & Salomon, Antoine, 2019. "A note on “Renegotiation in repeated games” [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360]," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 318-323.
- Günther, Michael, 2017. "A Note on "Renegotiation in Repeated Games" [Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 327–360]," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 572, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8759, University of California at Berkeley.
- Evans, Robert & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Efficient renegotiation--proof equilibria in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 361-369, December.
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- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1987. "On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games," Working papers 467, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
(Weak) Renegotiation-Proofness; Infinitely Repeated Games;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2018-10-01 (Game Theory)
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