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Independence and accountability within the monetary policy committee of the BCEAO

Author

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  • Régis Bokino
  • Moustapha Gano

Abstract

The organization of the monetary decision-making in central banks has changed internationally and for the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). The decisions are now taken by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). The arguments on the expected benefits of this procedure are provided by the economic literature and are linked to the recent wave of central bank independence. If the MPC is independent, it has an obligation to be accountable. However, independence and accountability are not identical in term of the MPC. This article examines the MPC of BCEAO established in 2010, which is independent in accordance with the recommendations of the credibility strategy of the new classical economics and collective accountability.

Suggested Citation

  • Régis Bokino & Moustapha Gano, 2018. "Independence and accountability within the monetary policy committee of the BCEAO," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2018-24, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
    • Handle: RePEc:grt:wpegrt:2018-24
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    CPM; central bank independence; accountability; BCEAO monetary policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • O55 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Africa

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