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Maximising Seigniorage and Inflation Tax: The Case of Belarus

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  • D r. (elect.) Julia Korosteleva

Abstract

While most Central European countries, realising the inflationary potential of money creation, had by the mid-1990s switched to market instruments based monetary policy, Belarus continued to use money emission, so gaining seigniorage and inflation tax. The productivity of the inflation tax can be analysed by comparing the revenue actually raised from inflation tax with the revenue that could be raised if the quantity of money had risen at a constant rate. The present paper, based on Cagan’s (1956) seminal work ‘Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation’, analyses the effect of inflation on seigniorage revenue in Belarus and draws conclusions about the effectiveness of monetary policy in 1995-2002, and about the consequences of inflationary financing.

Suggested Citation

  • D r. (elect.) Julia Korosteleva, "undated". "Maximising Seigniorage and Inflation Tax: The Case of Belarus," Working Papers 2006_5, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    • Handle: RePEc:gla:glaewp:2006_5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
    • C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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