The Organization of Public Service Provision
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- William Jack, 2004. "The Organization of Public Service Provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(3), pages 409-425, August.
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- Sacchi, Agnese & Salotti, Simone, 2014. "The asymmetric nature of fiscal decentralization: theory and practice," MPRA Paper 54506, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fabio Fiorillo & Michele G. Giuranno & Agnese Sacchi, 2021. "Asymmetric decentralization: distortions and opportunities," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 38(2), pages 625-656, July.
- William Jack, 2005. "Comparing the Distortionary Effects of Alternative Intergovernmental Transfers," Public Finance Review, , vol. 33(4), pages 488-505, July.
- Billy Jack, 2003. "Comparing the distortionary effects of alternative in-kind intergovernmental transfers," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-17, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
public service provision; political economy; random voting; incomplete contracts;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
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