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Pairwise consensus and Borda rule

Author

Listed:
  • Muhammad Mahajne

    (Univ. Lyon, UJM Saint-Etienne, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-42023 Saint-Etienne, France)

  • Oscar Volij

    (Ben Gurion University, Beer-Sheba, Israel)

Abstract

We say that a preference profile exhibits pairwise consensus around some fixed preference relation, if whenever a preference relation is closer to it than another one, the distance of the profile to the former is not greater than its distance to the latter. We say that a social choice rule satisfies the pairwise consensus property if it selects the top ranked alternative in the preference relation around which there is such a consensus. We show that the Borda rule is the unique scoring rule that satisfies this property.

Suggested Citation

  • Muhammad Mahajne & Oscar Volij, 2021. "Pairwise consensus and Borda rule," Working Papers 2102, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:2102
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pavel Yu. Chebotarev & Elena Shamis, 1998. "Characterizations of scoring methodsfor preference aggregation," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 80(0), pages 299-332, January.
    2. Shmuel Nitzan & Ariel Rubinstein, 1981. "A further characterization of Borda ranking method," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 153-158, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consensus; Borda rule; scoring rules;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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