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Pontozási rendszerek szimulációs összehasonlítása
[A simulatory comparison of the points systems]

Author

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  • Csató, László

Abstract

Egyéni preferencialisták aggregálásának elterjedt eszköze a pontozási rendszerek használata, amikor az egyes rangsorok minden pozíciója adott számú pontot ér, az aggregált sorrend pedig az alternatívák így összegyűjtött pontjai alapján alakul ki. Általában ezt az eljárást alkalmazzák több egymást követő versenyből álló sportbajnokságok eredményének meghatározására. Tanulmányunk ebben az összefüggésben vizsgálja a következő két, egyaránt elkerülendő esemény közötti átváltást: 1. a bajnoki cím korai megszerzése, már a sorozat utolsó néhány futama előtt ismertté válik a győztes kiléte; 2. a bajnok egyetlen versenyt sem nyer meg. Szimulációs megközelítés segítségével számszerűsítjük e kockázatokat a legrangosabb nemzetközi autóverseny, a Forma-1 négy történelmi pontozási rendszere esetében. Mindegyik versenyképesnek bizonyul a társadalmi választások elmélete által ajánlott, kedvező axiomatikus tulajdonsággal rendelkező mértani pontozással szemben. A jelenleg használt szabály észszerű kompromisszumnak tűnik a két veszély mérséklésére. Eredményeink hasznos adalékokkal szolgálnak a Forma-1 pontozási rendszereinek fejlődéséhez, és új szempontokkal gazdagítják az egyes pozíciókért járó pontok megválasztásának irodalmát.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: C44, C63, Z20.

Suggested Citation

  • Csató, László, 2021. "Pontozási rendszerek szimulációs összehasonlítása [A simulatory comparison of the points systems]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 847-862.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1986
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2021.7-8.847
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. László Csató, 2020. "Optimal Tournament Design: Lessons From the Men’s Handball Champions League," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 21(8), pages 848-868, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • Z20 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - General

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