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The Regulation of Hunting: A Population Tax

Author

Listed:
  • Jens Abildtrup

    (INRA, Laboratoire d´Economic Forestiere, Nancy, France)

  • Frank Jensen

    (Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

Within hunting, wildlife populations are estimated to be too high in many countries which is assumed to be due to the market failure, that each hunter harvests too little compared to what the regulator wants. This may be due to the existing regulation which, among other things, requires knowledge of the individual harvest. However, information about the individual harvest may be costly to obtain. Thus, we may have to look for alternatives to the existing system. This paper proposes a population tax/subsidy as an alternative which is the difference between the actual and optimal population multiplied by an individual, variable tax rate. The variable tax rate is, among other things, based on the difference in marginal value of the population between the hunter and the regulator. The paper shows that the population tax/subsidy secures a first-best optimum. Thus, the population tax is a good alternative to the existing regulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jens Abildtrup & Frank Jensen, 2012. "The Regulation of Hunting: A Population Tax," IFRO Working Paper 2012/2, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:foi:wpaper:2012_2
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    File URL: http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/WPpdf/WP2012/WP_2012_2_regulation_of_hunting.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Bulte, Erwin & Rondeau, Daniel, 2007. "Compensation for wildlife damages: Habitat conversion, species preservation and local welfare," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 311-322, November.
    3. Ropars-Collet, Carole, 2012. "Nuisible ou gibier? Une analyse économique de la chasse des grands animaux en France," Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement, Editions NecPlus, vol. 92(02), pages 161-181, October.
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    6. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2007. "Asymmetric information and uncertainty: The usefulness of logbooks as a regulation measure," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 815-827, September.
    7. Cabe, Richard & Herriges, Joseph A., 1992. "The regulation of non-point-source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 134-146, March.
    8. Richard Horan & Erwin Bulte, 2004. "Optimal and Open Access Harvesting of Multi-Use Species in a Second-Best World," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 28(3), pages 251-272, July.
    9. Urs Steiner Brandt & Niels Vestergaard, 2006. "Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(4), pages 974-985.
    10. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
    11. Horan, R.D. & Bulte, E.H., 2004. "Optimal and open access harvesting and multi-use species in a second best world," Other publications TiSEM 95000e50-7225-4f4d-aeaf-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zijin Xie, 2022. "Government intervention in wildlife damage management: a bioeconomic analysis of wildlife damage compensation and taxation policies," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 93-115, April.

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