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The Role of Bank Credit Enhancements in Securitization

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Abstract

As Nicola Cetorelli observes in his introductory post, securitization is a key element of the evolution from banking to shadow banking. Recognizing that raises the central question in this series: Does the rise of securitization (and shadow banking) signal the decline of traditional banking? Not necessarily, because banks can play a variety of background (or foreground) roles in the securitization process. In our published contribution to the series, we look at the role of banks in providing credit enhancements. Credit enhancements are protection in the form of financial support against losses on securitized assets in adverse circumstances. They’re the “magic elixir” that enables bankers to convert pools of possibly high-risk loans or mortgages into highly rated securities. This post highlights some findings from our article. One key finding: Banks are not being eclipsed by insurance companies (which are part of the shadow banking system) in the provision of credit enhancements.

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  • Benjamin H. Mandel & Donald P. Morgan & Chenyang Wei, 2012. "The Role of Bank Credit Enhancements in Securitization," Liberty Street Economics 20120718, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednls:86817
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    Cited by:

    1. Adrian, Tobias & Breuer, Peter & Ashcraft, Adam & Cetorelli, Nicola, 2018. "A Review of Shadow Banking," CEPR Discussion Papers 13363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Hodula, Martin, 2022. "Bringing the flashlight: Shadow banking in European Union countries," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(PB).
    3. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, 2012. "shadow banking: a review of the literature," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Ameha Tefera Tessema & Jan Walters Kruger, 2017. "An Improvement on An Interest Rate Commission Agent Banking System Model (AIRCABS Model)," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(4), pages 685-705.
    5. Fong, Tom Pak Wing & Sze, Angela Kin Wan & Ho, Edmund Ho Cheung, 2021. "Assessing cross-border interconnectedness between shadow banking systems," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    6. Zhang, Xiong, 2020. "Convertible tranche in securitization," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    7. Stefano Filomeni, 2024. "The impact of the Paycheck Protection Program on the risk-taking behaviour of US banks," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(4), pages 1329-1353, May.
    8. Kuncl, Martin, 2019. "Securitization under asymmetric information over the business cycle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 237-256.
    9. Flore, Raphael, 2015. "Causes of Shadow Banking - Two Regimes of Credit Risk Transformation and its Regulation," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113178, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft & Nicola Cetorelli, 2013. "Shadow bank monitoring," Staff Reports 638, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    11. Maurizio Trapanese, 2021. "The economics of non-bank financial intermediation: why do we need to fill the regulation gap?," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 625, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    12. Jyh-Horng Lin & Shi Chen & Fu-Wei Huang, 2018. "Bank Interest Margin, Multiple Shadow Banking Activities, and Capital Regulation," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 6(3), pages 1-20, July.
    13. Sarkisyan, Anna & Casu, Barbara, 2013. "Retained interests in securitisations and implications for bank solvency," Working Paper Series 1538, European Central Bank.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    shadow banking; Credit enhancements; securitization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets

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