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Endogenous export subsidies and welfare under domestic cost heterogeneity

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  • Subhayu Bandyopadhyay
  • Eun-Soo Park
  • Howard J. Wall

Abstract

We present a model of Cournot rivalry where domestic and foreign firms compete in a third-country market, and where the domestic export subsidy is determined by lobbying. Greater domestic cost heterogeneity (a mean-preserving spread of the marginal costs of the domestic firms) means that the subsidy level, aggregate domestic output, and domestic market share will all be higher. However, the effect of heterogeneity on domestic welfare is ambiguous. From a near-symmetric initial situation, greater domestic cost-heterogeneity reduces domestic welfare if the number of domestic firms exceeds some critical value. However, when starting further from symmetry, greater heterogeneity may raise welfare. Our results are in contrast with the no-lobbying scenario, where market share is independent of increased heterogeneity, and welfare is monotonically increasing in it.

Suggested Citation

  • Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Eun-Soo Park & Howard J. Wall, 1999. "Endogenous export subsidies and welfare under domestic cost heterogeneity," Working Papers 1999-017, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlwp:1999-017
    DOI: 10.20955/wp.1999.017
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    1. Moore, Michael O. & Suranovic, Steven M., 1993. "Lobbying and Cournot-Nash competition : Implications for strategic trade policy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3-4), pages 367-376, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Takauchi, Kazuhiro, 2015. "Strategic export policy, monopoly carrier, and product differentiation," MPRA Paper 66003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Hakan Orbay & Benan Zeki Orbay, 2013. "Export Subsidies and Exchange Rate Pass-through," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 627-635, September.
    3. Koichi Kagitani, 2008. "The Number Of Firms And The Politics Of Strategic Trade Policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(1), pages 107-122, February.
    4. Kim, Young-Han & Kim, Sang-Kee, 2012. "Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 614-620.
    5. Koichi Kagitani, 2009. "Political Economy Of Strategic Export Policy In A Differentiated Duopoly," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 60(2), pages 236-252, June.
    6. Seung‐Gyu Jo, 2010. "Non‐Uniform Strategic Trade Policy And Aggregate Profit Creation Effect," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(5), pages 644-662, November.

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