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Financial Stability Governance and Central Bank Communications

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Abstract

We investigate how central banks' governance frameworks influence their financial stability communication strategies and assess the effectiveness of these strategies in preventing a worsening of financial cycle conditions. We develop a simple conceptual framework of how central banks communicate about financial stability and how communication shapes the evolution of the financial cycle. We apply our framework using data on the governance characteristics of 24 central banks and the sentiment conveyed in their financial stability reports. We find robust evidence that communications by central banks participating in interagency financial stability committees more effectively mitigate a deterioration in financial conditions and advert a potential financial crisis. After observing a deterioration in conditions, such central banks also transmit a calmer message, suggesting that the ability to use policy tools other than communications strengthens incentives not to just "cry wolf".

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  • Stijn Claessens & Ricardo Correa & Juan M. Londono, 2021. "Financial Stability Governance and Central Bank Communications," International Finance Discussion Papers 1328, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:1328
    DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2021.1328
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Stability Governance; Natural Language Processing; Central Bank Communications; financial cycles;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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