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Central bank transparency and financial stability

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  • Horváth, Roman
  • Vaško, Dan

Abstract

We develop a comprehensive index of the transparency of central banks regarding their policy framework to safeguard financial stability for 110 countries from 2000 to 2011 and examine the determinants and effects of this transparency. We find that the degree of transparency increased in the 2000s, though it still varied greatly across the countries in our study. Our regression results suggest that the central banks that have a transparent monetary policy are more likely to show increased transparency in their framework for financial stability. More developed countries exhibit greater transparency, past episodes of high financial instability have a negative effect on transparency and the legal origin matters, too. In line with theoretical literature, our results also suggest a non-linear effect of central bank financial stability transparency on financial stability. If transparency is too high, it is not beneficial for financial stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Horváth, Roman & Vaško, Dan, 2016. "Central bank transparency and financial stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 45-56.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:22:y:2016:i:c:p:45-56
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2015.12.003
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    4. Ruttachai Seelajaroen & Pornanong Budsaratragoon & Boonlert Jitmaneeroj, 2020. "Do monetary policy transparency and central bank communication reduce interest rate disagreement?," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(3), pages 368-393, April.
    5. David M. Arseneau, 2020. "Central Bank Communication with a Financial Stability Objective," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-087, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Massimiliano Caporin & Mikhail Stolbov & Maria Shchepeleva, 2022. "What drives the expansion of research on banking crises? Cross-country evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(52), pages 6054-6064, November.
    7. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen & Petra Geraats, 2022. "Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency: Further Updates," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 18(1), pages 331-348, March.
    8. Roman Horvath, 2020. "Peer Effects in Central Banking," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 68(4), pages 764-814, December.
    9. Gertler, Pavel & Horvath, Roman, 2018. "Central bank communication and financial markets: New high-frequency evidence," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 336-345.
    10. de Moraes, Claudio Oliveira & Costa, Ágata, 2023. "Credit behavior and financial stability in an emerging economy," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 47(2).
    11. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli & Gaia Rubera, 2020. "Tweeting on Monetary Policy and Market Sentiments: The Central Bank Surprise Index," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 20134, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    12. Jayakumar, Manju & Pradhan, Rudra P. & Dash, Saurav & Maradana, Rana P. & Gaurav, Kunal, 2018. "Banking competition, banking stability, and economic growth: Are feedback effects at work?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 15-41.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial stability; Transparency; Central banks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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