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Mixed Signals: Investment Distortions with Adverse Selection

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Abstract

We study how adverse selection distorts equilibrium investment allocations in a Walrasian credit market with two-sided heterogeneity. Representative investor and partial equilibrium economies are special cases where investment allocations are distorted above perfect information allocations. By contrast, the general setting features a pecuniary externality that leads to trade and investment allocations below perfect information levels. The degree of heterogeneity between informed agents' type governs the direction of the distortion. Moreover, contracts that complete markets dampen the impact of pecuniary externalities and change equilibrium distortions. Implications for empirical design in credit market studies and financial stability are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Matt Darst & Ehraz Refayet, 2019. "Mixed Signals: Investment Distortions with Adverse Selection," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-044, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2019-44
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2019.044
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric Information; Cost Of Capital; Credit Default Swaps; Investment; Pecuniary Externality; Signalling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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