IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bay/rdwiwi/476.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model

Author

Listed:
  • Arnold, Lutz G.

Abstract

Contrary to what is consistently assumed in the literature, the return function cannot be hump-shaped in the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) model. This has important consequences for the possible occurrence of credit rationing and redlining. With a single class of borrowers, banks offer credit in two stages. Demand possibly exceeds supply in stage one, but not in stage two. With several observationally distinguishable borrower classes, the firms in a borrower class are redlined only under circumstances which imply that they would not get credit in a perfect capital market either. Die Rendite-Funktion kann im Stiglitz-Weiss- (1981) Modell nicht - so wie das in der Literatur durchgängig angenommen wird - hügelförmig sein. Das hat wichtige Implikationen für die Möglichkeit von Kreditrationierung einerseits und für die Möglichkeit des Ausschlusses ganzer Kreditnehmergruppen vom Kapitalmarkt andererseits. Mit nur einer Klasse von Kreditnehmern erfolgt die Kreditvergabe in zwei Stufen. Während auf der ersten Stufe eine Übernachfrage vorliegen kann, herrscht auf der zweiten Stufe Markträumung. Bei mehreren unterscheidbaren Kreditnehmerklassen wird eine Klasse nur unter den Bedingungen vom Kreditmarkt ausgeschlossen, bei deren Vorliegen sie auch in einem vollkommenen Kreditmarkt keinen Kredit erhalten würde.

Suggested Citation

  • Arnold, Lutz G., 2005. "On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model," University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems 403, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bay:rdwiwi:476
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/4518/1/sw.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
    2. Stephen D. Williamson, 1987. "Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 135-145.
    3. Greenwald, B & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1987. "Keynesian, New Keynesian and New Classical Economics," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 119-133, March.
    4. Hellwig, Martin, 1987. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection ," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 319-325.
    5. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    6. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
    7. Riley, John G, 1987. "Credit Rationing: A Further Remark [Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information] [Incentives Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets]," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 224-227, March.
    8. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    9. Hellmann, Thomas & Stiglitz, Joseph, 2000. "Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 281-304, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:bla:scotjp:v:49:y:2002:i:2:p:162-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Basab Dasupta, 2005. "Endogenous Growth in the Presence of Informal Credit Markets: A Comparative Analysis Between Credit Rationing and Self-Revelation Regimes," Working papers 2005-18, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    3. Anastasios, Dosis, 2019. "Interest Rates and Investment Under Competitive Screening and Moral Hazard," ESSEC Working Papers WP1902, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
    4. Enrico Minelli & Salvatore Modica, 2009. "Credit Market Failures and Policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 363-382, June.
    5. Thomas Barnebeck Andersen & Finn Tarp, 2003. "Financial liberalization, financial development and economic growth in LDCs," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(2), pages 189-209.
    6. Kjenstad, Einar C. & Su, Xunhua & Zhang, Li, 2015. "Credit rationing by loan size: A synthesized model," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 20-27.
    7. Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka, 2018. "Collateral in credit rationing in markets with asymmetric information," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 97-102.
    8. Rajalaxmi Kamath, 2006. "Public inputs and the credit market," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 13(6), pages 733-753, November.
    9. Winand Emons, 2007. "Conditional versus contingent fees," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 89-101, January.
    10. Ibrahimo, M.V. & Barros, C.P., 2009. "Relevance or irrelevance of capital structure?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 473-479, March.
    11. Buch, Claudia M., 1994. "Insolvency costs and incomplete information in commercial banks: Implications for financial reform in Eastern Europe," Kiel Working Papers 616, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    12. William G. Gale, 1990. "Collateral, Rationing, and Government Intervention in Credit Markets," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 43-62, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Figueroa, Nicolás & Leukhina, Oksana, 2018. "Cash flows and credit cycles," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 318-332.
    14. Coco, Giuseppe, 1999. "Collateral, heterogeneity in risk attitude and the credit market equilibrium," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 559-574, March.
    15. Maitreesh Ghatak & Massimo Morelli & Tomas Sjoström, 2001. "Credit rationing, wealth inequality, and allocation of talent," ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series 23-2001, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
    16. Claudio A. Piga & Gianfranco Atzeni, 2007. "R&D Investment, Credit Rationing And Sample Selection," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 149-178, April.
    17. Basab Dasgupta, 2004. "Capital Accumulation in the Presence of Informal Credit Contracts: Does the Incentive Mechanism Work Better than Credit Rationing Under Asymmetric Information?," Working papers 2004-32, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    18. Hellmann, Thomas & Stiglitz, Joseph, 2000. "Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 281-304, February.
    19. Blazy, Régis & Martel, Jocelyn & Nigam, Nirjhar, 2014. "The choice between informal and formal restructuring: The case of French banks facing distressed SMEs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 248-263.
    20. Bruno Coric, 2010. "Investments and capital market imperfections, identification issues: a survey," Financial Theory and Practice, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 34(4), pages 407-434.
    21. Innes, Robert, 1987. "Adverse Selection And Tax Externalities In A Model Of Entrepreneurial Investment," Working Papers 225812, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Kreditrestriktion ; Asymmetrische Information; ; credit rationing ; asymmetric information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bay:rdwiwi:476. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Gernot Deinzer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/wfregde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.