IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fip/fedgfe/2012-55.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Estimating changes in supervisory standards and their economic effects

Author

Abstract

The disappointingly slow recovery in the U.S. from the recent recession and financial crisis has once again focused attention on the relationship between financial frictions and economic growth. With bank loans having only recently started growing and still sluggish, some bankers and borrowers have suggested that unnecessarily tight supervisory policies have been a constraint on new lending that is hindering recovery. This paper explores one specific aspect of supervisory policy: whether the standards used to assign commercial bank CAMELS ratings have changed materially over time (1991-2011). We show that models incorporating time-varying parameters or economy-wide variables suggest that standards used in the assignment of CAMELS ratings in recent years generally have been in line with historical experience. Indeed, each of the models used in this analysis suggests that the variation in those standards has been relatively small in absolute terms over most of the sample period. However, we show that when this particular aspect of supervisory stringency becomes elevated, it has a noticeable dampening effect on lending activity in subsequent quarters.

Suggested Citation

  • William F. Bassett & Seung Jung Lee & Thomas W. Spiller, 2012. "Estimating changes in supervisory standards and their economic effects," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-55, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2012-55
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201255/201255abs.html
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2012/201255/201255pap.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ben S. Bernanke & Kenneth N. Kuttner, 2005. "What Explains the Stock Market's Reaction to Federal Reserve Policy?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1221-1257, June.
    2. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2001. "Prudential Supervision: Why Is It Important and What Are the Issues?," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 1-30, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M. B. Tootell, 1999. "Is Bank Supervision Central to Central Banking?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(2), pages 629-653.
    4. Lown, Cara & Morgan, Donald P., 2006. "The Credit Cycle and the Business Cycle: New Findings Using the Loan Officer Opinion Survey," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(6), pages 1575-1597, September.
    5. anonymous, 2001. "Revisions to staff commentary on Regulation E," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue May, pages 306-306.
    6. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Self-Interested Bank Regulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 206-212, May.
    7. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric S & Tootell, Geoffrey M B, 2003. "Identifying the Macroeconomic Effect of Loan Supply Shocks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(6), pages 931-946, December.
    8. Peek, Joe & Rosengren, Eric S. & Tootell, Geoffrey M. B., 2003. "Does the federal reserve possess an exploitable informational advantage?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 817-839, May.
    9. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2005. "Simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dynamic, nonlinear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 39-54, January.
    10. Berger, Allen N. & Udell, Gregory F., 2004. "The institutional memory hypothesis and the procyclicality of bank lending behavior," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 458-495, October.
    11. Haltenhof, Samuel & Jung Lee, Seung & Stebunovs, Viktors, 2014. "The credit crunch and fall in employment during the Great Recession," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 31-57.
    12. Curry, Timothy J. & Fissel, Gary S. & Ramirez, Carlos D., 2008. "The impact of bank supervision on loan growth," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 113-134, August.
    13. Mundlak, Yair, 1978. "On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(1), pages 69-85, January.
    14. Bassett, William F. & Chosak, Mary Beth & Driscoll, John C. & Zakrajšek, Egon, 2014. "Changes in bank lending standards and the macroeconomy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 23-40.
    15. Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588, April.
    16. John Krainer & Jose A. Lopez, 2009. "Do supervisory rating standards change over time?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 13-24.
    17. Oaxaca, Ronald, 1973. "Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 14(3), pages 693-709, October.
    18. Allen N. Berger & Margaret K. Kyle & Joseph M. Scalise, 2001. "Did US Bank Supervisors Get Tougher during the Credit Crunch? Did They Get Easier during the Banking Boom? Did It Matter to Bank Lending?," NBER Chapters, in: Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn't, pages 301-356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Elizabeth K. Kiser & Robin A. Prager & Jason R. Scott, 2012. "Supervisor ratings and the contraction of bank lending to small businesses," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-59, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    20. António Afonso & Pedro Gomes & Philipp Rother, 2011. "Short‐ and long‐run determinants of sovereign debt credit ratings," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, January.
    21. Sumit Agarwal & David Lucca & Amit Seru & Francesco Trebbi, 2014. "Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 129(2), pages 889-938.
    22. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2005. "Simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dynamic, nonlinear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 39-54, January.
    23. Nelson, Charles R & Siegel, Andrew F, 1987. "Parsimonious Modeling of Yield Curves," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(4), pages 473-489, October.
    24. James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, 1989. "New Indexes of Coincident and Leading Economic Indicators," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989, Volume 4, pages 351-409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    25. Alan S. Blinder, 1973. "Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 8(4), pages 436-455.
    26. Bernanke, Ben S, 1983. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 257-276, June.
    27. Curry, Timothy J. & Fissel, Gary S. & Hanweck, Gerald A., 2008. "Is there cyclical bias in bank holding company risk ratings?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 1297-1309, July.
    28. DeYoung, Robert, et al, 2001. "The Information Content of Bank Exam Ratings and Subordinated Debt Prices," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(4), pages 900-925, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lakshmi Balasubramanyan & Joseph G. Haubrich, 2014. "What do we know about regional banks? An exploratory analysis," Working Papers (Old Series) 1316, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    2. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner, 2022. "Bank Supervision," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 39-56, November.
    3. Francesco Marchionne & Michele Fratianni & Federico Giri & Luca Papi, 2022. "Frequency vs. Size of Bank Fines in Local Credit Markets," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 8(3), pages 549-583, November.
    4. Aparicio, Juan & Duran, Miguel A. & Lozano-Vivas, Ana & Pastor, Jesus T., 2018. "Are charter value and supervision aligned? A segmentation analysis," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 60-73.
    5. Bassett, William F. & Chosak, Mary Beth & Driscoll, John C. & Zakrajšek, Egon, 2014. "Changes in bank lending standards and the macroeconomy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 23-40.
    6. Marsh, W. Blake, 2023. "Supervisory stringency, payout restrictions, and bank equity prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    7. Franco Fiordelisi & Gabriele Lattanzio & Davide S. Mare, 2022. "How binding is supervisory guidance? Evidence from the European calendar provisioning," Working Papers 2022/05, Nazarbayev University, Graduate School of Business.
    8. Pavel Kapinos, 2021. "Paycheck Protection Program: County-Level Determinants and Effect on Unemployment," Working Papers 2105, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    9. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner & Matthew Plosser, 2020. "The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(5), pages 2765-2808, October.
    10. Gilani, Usman & Keasey, Kevin & Vallascas, Francesco, 2021. "Board financial expertise and the capital decisions of US banks," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    11. Zhivaikina, A. & Peresetsky, A., 2017. "Russian Bank Credit Ratings and Bank License Withdrawal 2012-2016," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 49-80.
    12. Elizabeth K. Kiser & Robin A. Prager & Jason R. Scott, 2012. "Supervisor ratings and the contraction of bank lending to small businesses," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-59, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    13. Michael B. Imerman, 2020. "When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(4), pages 1371-1406, November.
    14. Michael B. Imerman, 0. "When enough is not enough: bank capital and the Too-Big-To-Fail subsidy," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-36.
    15. Berger, Allen N. & El Ghoul, Sadok & Guedhami, Omrane & Roman, Raluca A., 2022. "Geographic deregulation and banks’ cost of equity capital," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    16. Konstantinos Drakos & Ioannis Malandrakis, 2021. "Global Versus Non-Global Banks: A Capital Ratios-Based Analysis," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 10(2), pages 5-22.
    17. Yang, Ling, 2016. "Is Bank Supervision Effective? Evidence from the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses," MPRA Paper 75761, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. John Kandrac & Bernd Schlusche, 2017. "The Effect of Bank Supervision on Risk Taking : Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-079, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    19. Lewis Gaul & Jonathan Jones & Pinar Uysal, 2019. "Forecasting High-Risk Composite CAMELS Ratings," International Finance Discussion Papers 1252, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    20. Bassett, William F. & Marsh, W. Blake, 2017. "Assessing targeted macroprudential financial regulation: The case of the 2006 commercial real estate guidance for banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 209-228.
    21. Meeks, Roland, 2017. "Capital regulation and the macroeconomy: Empirical evidence and macroprudential policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 125-141.
    22. Hwa, Vivian & Kapinos, Pavel & Ramirez, Carlos D., 2018. "Does regulatory bank oversight impact economic activity? A local projections approach," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 167-174.
    23. Clark, Ephraim & Mare, Davide Salvatore & Radić, Nemanja, 2018. "Cooperative banks: What do we know about competition and risk preferences?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 90-101.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Beverly Hirtle & Anna Kovner & Matthew Plosser, 2020. "The Impact of Supervision on Bank Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(5), pages 2765-2808, October.
    2. Hwa, Vivian & Kapinos, Pavel & Ramirez, Carlos D., 2018. "Does regulatory bank oversight impact economic activity? A local projections approach," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 167-174.
    3. Bassett, William F. & Marsh, W. Blake, 2017. "Assessing targeted macroprudential financial regulation: The case of the 2006 commercial real estate guidance for banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 209-228.
    4. William F. Bassett & W. Blake Marsh, 2014. "Assessing Targeted Macroprudential Financial Regulation: The Case of the 2006 Commercial Real Estate Guidance for Banks," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2014-49, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Gaul, Lewis & Palvia, Ajay, 2013. "Are regulatory management evaluations informative about bank accounting returns and risk?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 1-21.
    6. Tesfaye, Wondimagegn & Tirivayi, Nyasha, 2020. "Crop diversity, household welfare and consumption smoothing under risk: Evidence from rural Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    7. Andrea Orame, 2020. "The role of bank supply in the Italian credit market: evidence from a new regional survey," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1279, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    8. Erika Raquel Badillo & Rosina Moreno, 2016. "Are Collaborative Agreements in Innovation Activities Persistent at the Firm Level? Empirical Evidence for the Spanish Case," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(1), pages 71-101, August.
    9. Richard Bluhm & Martin Gassebner & Sarah Langlotz & Paul Schaudt, 2021. "Fueling conflict? (De)escalation and bilateral aid," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(2), pages 244-261, March.
    10. Saha, U.R. & van Soest, A.H.O., 2009. "Infant Mortality in Rural Bangladesh : State Dependence vs. Unobserved Heterogeneity," Other publications TiSEM c6939d37-f018-49e2-bc6e-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Jason Abrevaya & Yu-Chin Hsu, 2021. "Partial effects in non-linear panel data models with correlated random effects," The Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 24(3), pages 519-535.
    12. Bluhm, Richard & Crombrugghe, Denis de & Szirmai, Adam, 2012. "Explaining the dynamics of stagnation: An empirical examination of the North, Wallis and Weingast approach," MERIT Working Papers 2012-040, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    13. Dang, Rey & Houanti, L'Hocine & Sahut, Jean-Michel & Simioni, Michel, 2021. "Do women on corporate boards influence corporate social performance? A control function approach," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(C).
    14. Toni Mora & Joan Gil & Antoni Sicras-Mainar, 2015. "The influence of obesity and overweight on medical costs: a panel data perspective," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 16(2), pages 161-173, March.
    15. Hajivassiliou, Vassilis, 2019. "Estimation and specification testing of panel data models with non-ignorable persistent heterogeneity, contemporaneous and intertemporal simultaneity and observable and unobservable dynamics," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102843, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Manudeep Bhuller & Christian N. Brinch & Sebastian Königs, 2017. "Time Aggregation and State Dependence in Welfare Receipt," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 1833-1873, September.
    17. Sarah Brown & Mark N. Harris & Christopher Spencer & Karl Taylor, 2024. "Financial Expectations and Household Consumption: Does Middle‐Inflation Matter?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(4), pages 741-768, June.
    18. Giuseppe Arcangelis & Majlinda Joxhe, 2015. "How do migrants save? Evidence from the British Household Panel Survey on temporary and permanent migrants versus natives," IZA Journal of Migration and Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-23, December.
    19. Francesco Bartolucci & Claudia Pigini, 2017. "Granger causality in dynamic binary short panel data models," Working Papers 421, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    20. Saule Kemelbayeva, 2020. "Returns to schooling in Kazakhstan: an update using a pseudo-panel approach," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 10(3), pages 437-487, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2012-55. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ryan Wolfslayer ; Keisha Fournillier (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbgvus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.