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The effect of automated underwriting on the profitability of mortgage securitization

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Abstract

Over the past two years, many mortgage market analysts have praised automated underwriting as a technological innovation that will lower the costs of processing mortgage applications. However, automated underwriting is unlikely to decrease processing costs uniformly for all mortgage applications. Instead, it makes identifying and processing low-risk mortgage borrowers less costly, but may not significantly lower the costs of identifying and processing relatively high-risk applicants. Our results suggest that after the one-time cost reduction produced by automated underwriting, the resulting mortgage market equilibrium is characterized by lower mortgage rates and lower profits for the mortgage securitizer.

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  • Wayne Passmore & Roger Sparks, 1997. "The effect of automated underwriting on the profitability of mortgage securitization," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-19, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:1997-19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Passmore, Wayne & Sparks, Roger, 1996. "Putting the Squeeze on a Market for Lemons: Government-Sponsored Mortgage Securitization," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 27-43, July.
    2. Wayne Passmore, 1991. "Can retail depositories fund mortgages profitably?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 175, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Wayne Passmore, 1992. "The influence of risk-adjusted capital regulations on asset allocation by savings and loans," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 213, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. John L. Goodman & Wayne Passmore, 1992. "Market power and the pricing of mortgage securitization," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 187, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passmore & Brian J. Surette, 1996. "Distribution of credit risk among providers of mortgages to lower- income and minority homebuyers," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Dec, pages 1077-1102.
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    8. Altman, Edward I., 1980. "Commercial Bank Lending: Process, Credit Scoring, and Costs of Errors in Lending," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(4), pages 813-832, November.
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    11. William H. Greene, 1992. "A Statistical Model for Credit Scoring," Working Papers 92-29, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
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    Keywords

    Mortgages; Asset-backed financing;

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