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Asset class diversification and delegation of responsibilities between central banks and sovereign wealth funds

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  • Joshua Aizenman
  • Reuven Glick

Abstract

This paper presents a model comparing the optimal degree of asset class diversification abroad by a central bank and a sovereign wealth fund. We show that if the central bank manages its foreign asset holdings in order to meet balance of payments needs, particularly in reducing the probability of sudden stops in foreign capital inflows, it will place a high weight on holding safer foreign assets. In contrast, if the sovereign wealth fund, acting on behalf of the Treasury, maximizes the expected utility of a representative domestic agent, it will opt for relatively greater holding of more risky foreign assets. We also show how the diversification differences between the strategies of the bank and SWF is affected by the government?s delegation of responsibilities and by various parameters of the economy, such as the volatility of equity returns and the total amount of public foreign assets available for management.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, 2010. "Asset class diversification and delegation of responsibilities between central banks and sovereign wealth funds," Working Paper Series 2010-20, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfwp:2010-20
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Joshua Aizenman & Nancy Marion, 2004. "International Reserve Holdings with Sovereign Risk and Costly Tax Collection," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(497), pages 569-591, July.
    3. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1037-1047, April.
    4. Edwin M. Truman, 2009. "A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 9(1), pages 429-451.
    5. Joshua Aizenman & Jaewoo Lee, 2007. "International Reserves: Precautionary Versus Mercantilist Views, Theory and Evidence," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 191-214, April.
    6. Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, 2009. "Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stylized Facts about their Determinants and Governance," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 351-386, December.
    7. Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, 2008. "Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes—A Trap?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(4), pages 817-835, June.
    8. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    9. Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, 2007. "Sovereign wealth funds: stumbling blocks or stepping stones to financial globalization?," FRBSF Economic Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue dec14.
    10. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
    11. Olivier Jeanne, 2007. "International Reserves in Emerging Market Countries: Too Much of a Good Thing?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 38(1), pages 1-80.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carpantier, J.-F. & Vermeulen, W.N., 2018. "Emergence of sovereign wealth funds," Journal of Commodity Markets, Elsevier, vol. 11(C), pages 1-21.
    2. Bahoo, Salman & Alon, Ilan & Paltrinieri, Andrea, 2020. "Sovereign wealth funds: Past, present and future," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    3. Joshua Aizenman & Daniel Riera-Crichton, 2015. "Desafíos del Manejo de la Liquidez y de los Activos Internacionales en Latinoamérica," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 18(2), pages 62-96, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banks and banking; Central; Sovereign wealth fund;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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