IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/reveho/v3y2005i4p367-385.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

For Better or For Worse? State-Level Marital Formation and Risk Sharing

Author

Listed:
  • Ralph Chami
  • Gregory Hess

Abstract

Why do some U.S. states have higher levels of marital formation than others? This paper introduces an economic model wherein a state’s representative individual may choose to marry in order to diversify his or her idiosyncratic income risk. The paper demonstrates that such a diversification motive is enhanced for some utility functions when a state’s level of undiversifiable risk becomes larger, and when a state’s initial income is lower. A test of the model’s predictions, using cross-sectional data for the 50 U.S. states, provides some suggestive evidence for a risk sharing motive in marriage formation and joint spouse labor participation. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph Chami & Gregory Hess, 2005. "For Better or For Worse? State-Level Marital Formation and Risk Sharing," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 367-385, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:reveho:v:3:y:2005:i:4:p:367-385
    DOI: 10.1007/s11150-005-4940-2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11150-005-4940-2
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11150-005-4940-2?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gregory D. Hess, 2004. "Marriage and Consumption Insurance: What's Love Got to Do with It?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 290-318, April.
    2. Kimball, Miles S, 1990. "Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January.
    3. Gregory D. Hess & Kwanho Shin, 1999. "Risk sharing of disaggregate macroeconomic and idiosyncratic shocks," Working Papers (Old Series) 9915, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    4. Ralph Chami & Gregory Hess, 2005. "For Better or For Worse? State-Level Marital Formation and Risk Sharing," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 367-385, December.
    5. Ogaki, Masao & Zhang, Qiang, 2001. "Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion and Tests of Risk Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 515-526, March.
    6. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Spivak, Avia, 1981. "The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(2), pages 372-391, April.
    7. Grossbard,Shoshana A. (ed.), 2003. "Marriage and the Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521814546, November.
    8. Hess, Gregory D. & Shin, Kwanho, 2000. "Risk sharing by households within and across regions and industries," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 533-560, June.
    9. Mace, Barbara J, 1991. "Full Insurance in the Presence of Aggregate Uncertainty," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 928-956, October.
    10. Leora Friedberg, 1998. "Did Unilateral Divorce Raise Divorce Rates? Evidence from Panel Data," NBER Working Papers 6398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Susan Dynarski & Jonathan Gruber, 1997. "Can Families Smooth Variable Earnings?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 28(1), pages 229-303.
    12. Athanasoulis, Stefano G. & van Wincoop, Eric, 2000. "Growth uncertainty and risksharing," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 477-505, June.
    13. Grossbard,Shoshana A. (ed.), 2003. "Marriage and the Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521891431, November.
    14. Del Negro, Marco, 2002. "Asymmetric shocks among U.S. states," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 273-297, March.
    15. Kimball, Miles S, 1993. "Standard Risk Aversion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 589-611, May.
    16. Rosenzweig, Mark R & Stark, Oded, 1989. "Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and Marriage: Evidence from Rural India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(4), pages 905-926, August.
    17. Jonathan Gruber, 2000. "Is Making Divorce Easier Bad for Children? The Long Run Implications of Unilateral Divorce," NBER Working Papers 7968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Hess, Gregory D. & Shin, Kwanho, 1998. "Intranational business cycles in the United States," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 289-313, April.
    19. Todd E. Clark & Kwanho Shin, 1998. "The sources of fluctuations within and across countries," Research Working Paper 98-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    20. Cochrane, John H, 1991. "A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 957-976, October.
    21. Mario J Crucini & Gregory D. Hess, 1999. "International and Intranational Risk Sharing," CESifo Working Paper Series 227, CESifo.
    22. Lupton, J. & Smith, J.P., 1999. "Marriage, Assets, and Savings," Papers 99-12, RAND - Labor and Population Program.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ralph Chami & Gregory Hess, 2005. "For Better or For Worse? State-Level Marital Formation and Risk Sharing," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 367-385, December.
    2. Lukach, R. & Plasmans, J.E.J., 2002. "Measuring Knowledge Spillovers using Patent Citations : Evidence from the Belgian Firm's Data," Other publications TiSEM d78bf59a-e0ff-4451-86b9-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Martin Halla & Johann Scharler, 2012. "Marriage, Divorce, and Interstate Risk Sharing," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(1), pages 55-78, March.
    4. Stephen Shore, 2015. "The co-movement of couples’ incomes," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 569-588, September.
    5. Pierfederico Asdrubali & Simone Tedeschi & Luigi Ventura, 2020. "Household risk‐sharing channels," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), pages 1109-1142, July.
    6. Filippo Pericoli & Luigi Ventura, 2012. "Family dissolution and precautionary savings: an empirical analysis," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 573-595, December.
    7. Nzinga Broussard & Ralph Chami & Gregory Hess, 2015. "(Why) Do self-employed parents have more children?," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 297-321, June.
    8. Christopher Brown & Randall Kesselring, 2006. "Declining marriage ratios of young black women: Testing alternative economic hypotheses," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 33(4), pages 27-48, March.
    9. Wataru Kureishi & Midori Wakabayashi, 2013. "What motivates single women to save? the case of Japan," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 681-704, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Martin Halla & Johann Scharler, 2012. "Marriage, Divorce, and Interstate Risk Sharing," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(1), pages 55-78, March.
    2. Gregory D. Hess, 2004. "Marriage and Consumption Insurance: What's Love Got to Do with It?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 290-318, April.
    3. Filippo Pericoli & Luigi Ventura, 2012. "Family dissolution and precautionary savings: an empirical analysis," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 573-595, December.
    4. Attilio Gardini & Giuseppe Cavaliere & Luca Fanelli, 2005. "Risk Sharing, avversione al rischio e stabilizzazione delle economie regionali in Italia," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, vol. 95(3), pages 219-266, May-June.
    5. Del Negro, Marco, 2002. "Asymmetric shocks among U.S. states," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 273-297, March.
    6. Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2010. "How Much Does Household Collateral Constrain Regional Risk Sharing?," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(2), pages 265-294, April.
    7. Pierfederico Asdrubali & Simone Tedeschi & Luigi Ventura, 2020. "Household risk‐sharing channels," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), pages 1109-1142, July.
    8. Stefano Athanasoulis & Eric Van Wincoop, 1998. "Risksharing within the United States: what have financial markets and fiscal federalism accomplished?," Research Paper 9808, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    9. Dirk Bethmann & Michael Kvasnicka, 2007. "Uncertain Paternity, Mating Market Failure, and the Institution of Marriage," Discussion Paper Series 0701, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    10. Bertocchi, Graziella & Brunetti, Marianna & Torricelli, Costanza, 2011. "Marriage and other risky assets: A portfolio approach," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 2902-2915, November.
    11. Stéphane Mechoulan, 2006. "Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 143-174, January.
    12. Marcel Fafchamps & Agnes R. Quisumbing & IFPRI, 2006. "Household Formation and Marriage Markets," Economics Series Working Papers GPRG-WPS-039, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    13. Harold Alderman & Christina H. Paxson, 1994. "Do the Poor Insure? A Synthesis of the Literature on Risk and Consumption in Developing Countries," International Economic Association Series, in: Edmar L. Bacha (ed.), Economics in a Changing World, chapter 3, pages 48-78, Palgrave Macmillan.
    14. Jaramillo, Fernando & Kempf, Hubert & Moizeau, Fabien, 2015. "Heterogeneity and the formation of risk-sharing coalitions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 79-96.
    15. Masao Ogaki & Qiang Zhang, 2000. "Risk Sharing in Village India: the Rule of Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion," Working Papers 00-02, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
    16. Kurosaki, Takashi & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2002. "Insurance market efficiency and crop choices in Pakistan," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 419-453, April.
    17. Becker, Sascha O. & Hoffmann, Mathias, 2010. "Equity fund ownership and the cross-regional diversification of household risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 90-102, January.
    18. Grimard, Franque, 1997. "Household consumption smoothing through ethnic ties: evidence from Cote d'Ivoire," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 391-422, August.
    19. Jacobs, Kris & Pallage, Stéphane & Robe, Michel A., 2013. "Market incompleteness and the equity premium puzzle: Evidence from state-level data," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 378-388.
    20. Tullio Jappelli & Luigi Pistaferri, 2006. "Intertemporal Choice and Consumption Mobility," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(1), pages 75-115, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    consumption insurance; marriage; J12; D1; E21;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:reveho:v:3:y:2005:i:4:p:367-385. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.