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Property tax limits and local fiscal behavior: did Massachusetts cities and towns spend too little on town services under proposition 2 1/2?

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  • Katharine L. Bradbury

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of a specific local tax limit, Proposition 2 in Massachusetts, on the fiscal behavior of cities and towns in Massachusetts and the capitalization of that behavior into property values. Proposition 2 places a cap on the effective property tax rate at 2.5 percent and limits nominal annual growth in property tax revenues to 2.5 percent, unless residents pass a referendum (an override) allowing a greater increase. The study analyzes the 1990-94 period, a time when Massachusetts municipalities faced significant fiscal stress because of a 30 percent cut in real estate aid and a demographically driven increase in school enrollments. The findings include the following: (1) Proposition 2 significantly constrained local spending in some communities; (2) constrained communities realized gains in property values to the degree that they were able to increase school spending despite the limitation; and (3) changes in school spending were a much stronger influence on house price changes than were changes in nonschool spending. These findings are confirmed using several different econometric approaches, including a two-stage technique that directly estimates how close each community's spending was to what it would have been in the absence of Proposition 2.

Suggested Citation

  • Katharine L. Bradbury, 1997. "Property tax limits and local fiscal behavior: did Massachusetts cities and towns spend too little on town services under proposition 2 1/2?," Working Papers 97-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbwp:97-2
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    File URL: http://www.bostonfed.org/economic/wp/wp1997/wp97_2.htm
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brueckner, Jan K., 1982. "A test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 311-331, December.
    2. Katharine L. Bradbury, 1988. "Shifting property tax burdens in Massachusetts," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Sep, pages 36-48.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel R Mullins, 2010. "Fiscal Limitations on Local Choice: The Imposition and Effects of Local Government Tax and Expenditure Limitations," Chapters, in: Sally Wallace (ed.), State and Local Fiscal Policy, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Elio H Londero, 2004. "Measuring Benefits, Tracing Distributional Effects, and Affecting Distributional Outcomes," Public Economics 0407011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Elio H Londero, 2004. "Poverty Targeting Classifications and Distributional Effects," Public Economics 0407012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Katharine L. Bradbury & Karl E. Case & Christopher J. Mayer, 1998. "School quality and Massachusetts enrollment shifts in the context of tax limitations," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jul, pages 3-20.
    5. Hilber, Christian A.L. & Mayer, Christopher, 2009. "Why do households without children support local public schools? Linking house price capitalization to school spending," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 74-90, January.
    6. Thomas A. Downes & Jeffrey E. Zabel, 1997. "The Impact of School Quality on House Prices: Chicago 1987-1991," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9704, Department of Economics, Tufts University.

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    Keywords

    Massachusetts; Property tax;

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